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Introduction 
   Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (982–1054 c.e.), also known under his honorific title of Atiśa,1 
is famous for coming to Tibet and revitalizing Buddhism there during the early 
eleventh century. Atiśa was a charismatic teacher and translator who, during his 
thirteen years in Tibet (1042–54 c.e.), influenced Tibetans to rethink the integration of 
mainstream and Mahāyāna Buddhist principles with the practices of secret mantra or 
Vajrayāna. 
This article examines, and furnishes translations for, the Madhyamakopadésa 
(“Special Instructions of the Middle Way”) of Atiśa, along with an Indian commentary 
by Prajñāmukti (Tib. Shes rab thar pa), the Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti, and a more 
extensive Tibetan commentary by an anonymous bKa’-gdams-pa (hereafter, Kadampa) 
author entitled Collection on the Two Realities (bden gnyis kyi ’bum). The 
Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti is translated in its entirety for the first time in English2, while 
the Collection on the Two Realities is identified for the first time as a commentary on 
Atiśa’s Madhyamakopadésa, as well as being an initial English translation. These three 
texts provide an important case study in the Madhyamaka (“Middle Way Philosophy”) 
of India and Tibet during the early eleventh to twelfth century. Although all three texts 
were composed in Tibet (see below), the base text by Atiśa and the brief commentary 
(vṛtti) by Prajñāmukti were written by Indian authors initially in Sanskrit, while the 
Collection on the Two Realities is by a Tibetan author. The texts demonstrate the 
distinctions between how an Indian Buddhist authored text was commented upon by an 
                                                   
1 As noted by Eimer (1982:47n1) and Sopa (2001: 24n2), the form Atiśa is derived from the Sanskrit 
atiśaya, “eminent, superior” (Tib. phul (du) byung (ba)) rather than Sanskrit ati + īśa, “the great 
Lord” which is not permitted by the rules of Sanskrit grammar. Tibetans often refer to Atiśa as jo bo, 
“(The) Lord.”  
2  Tibetan critical editions of the Madhyamakopadeśa and Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti, along with 
annotated Japanese translations, may be found in Mochizuki 2002.  
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Indian commentator such as Prajñāmukti, who was a contemporary of Atiśa, and a later 
Tibetan commentator who belonged to the early twelfth-century lineage of Kadampa 
followers of Atiśa. In brief, Prajñāmukti is concise and to the point, providing the 
reader explanatory glosses on most of the words and phrases found in Atiśa’s basic text. 
The anonymous Kadampa commentator, on the other hand, provides extended 
explanations to unpack the overall doctrinal meaning of Atiśa’s text.  The anonymous 
Tibetan author cites a number of well-known Kadampa figures with idiomatic Tibetan 
expressions in addition to his references of Indian Buddhist authors and sūtras.   
The Madhyamakopadésa is a brief text on the practice of Madhyamaka in 
meditation. The term upadeśa “special instructions” in the title of Atiśa’s basic text is a 
term that has a long history in Indian Buddhism with different connotations over the 
centuries. As Étienne Lamotte has remarked in his study of the Mahāprajñā- 
pāramitāśāstra (Vol. 3, 1970:vii-viii), upadeśa is the name of the twelfth and last 
member of the “twelve-membered” word of the Buddha (dvādaśāṅgabuddhavacana) 
and generally signifies “instruction” or “teaching.” A number of scholastic Indian 
Buddhist texts preserved in the Chinese Tripiṭaka have upadeśa in their title, such as 
the upadeśas on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (T 1519, 1520), attributed to Vasubandhu. 
The Tibetan Tanjur has dozens of texts containing upadeśa in their titles. Atiśa 
authored and translated several texts with upadeśa in the title, such as the Sūtrārtha- 
samuccayopadeśa (Mdo’i sde’i don kun las btus pa’i man ngag, Tôh. no. 3957) and the 
Ekasmṛtyupadeśa (Dran pa gcig pa'i man ngag, Tôh. no. 3928). The term upadeśa 
translated into Tibetan as either gdams ngag or man ngag generally means, as Kapstein 
(1996: 275) notes, “the immediate, heartfelt instructions and admonitions of master to 
disciple concerning directly liberative insight and practice.” The Madhyamakopadeśa 
is therefore special guidance or instructions concerning the practice of Middle Way 
philosophy. Several different lineages of this type of instruction and practice on 
Madhyamaka were brought into Tibet. Atiśa’s lineage of the Madhyamakopadeśa was 
commented upon at least up until the 13th century as Skyo-ston smon-lam tshul-khrims 
(1219-1299) wrote a brief text on this topic entitled Explanation of Lord [Atiśa’s] 
Middle Way Special Instructions (jo bo rje’i dbu ma’i man ngag gi bshad pa). Another 
lineage of similar instructions, Guidance on the Great Middle Way (dbu ma chen po’i 
khrid), was brought into Tibet by Zla-ba rgyal-mtshan (12th century) (Kapstein 
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1996:282). mChims nam-mkha’ grags (1210-1285), a Kadampa author, also wrote a 
commentary on this lineage of instruction entitled Guidance on the Middle Way (dbu 
ma'i khrid), different than Atiśa’s lineage. Other lineages of Middle Way practice 
instructions also existed in Tibet and this genre of Middle Way instructions influenced 
later Tibetans scholars such as Red-mda’-ba gzhon-nu blo-gros (1349-1412) and 
Tsong-kha-pa blo-gzang grags-pa (1357-1419) who composed their own Middle Way 
guidance instructions (dbu ma’i khrid). The historical relations between these lineages 
are a topic for future reaseach. For now, Atiśa’s Madhyamakopadésa and its earliest 
known Indian and Tibetan commentaries are the focus. In the following sections, I 
introduce, contextualize, and translate each of these texts.      
 
Atiśa’s Madhyamakopadésa 
The Madhyamakopadésa, “Special Instructions of the Middle Way,” along with the 
Satyadvayāvatāra, “Entry to the Two Realities” (Apple 2013), are considered by 
traditional Gelukpa (dge lugs pa) historians to be the two foremost textual teachings 
(gzhung) on the view (lta ba) within Atiśa’s works.3 An early Kadampa commentary 
on the Satyadvayāvatāra, attributed to Rnal-’byor-pa shes-rab rdo-rje (ca. 1125) who 
was a direct disciple of Sha-ra-ba yon-tan grags (1070-1141), understands the 
Madhyamakopadésa to be a text on meditation (sgom pa).4 Be that as it may, most all 
traditional sources mention that this teaching was given by Atiśa in Lhasa at the request 
of Rngog legs pa’i shes rab (11th century), also known as “Gsang phu ba,” who was a 
direct disciple of Atiśa (van der Kuijp 1987:105), and who later founded the early 
Kadampa monastery of Gsang-phu ne’u-thog around 1073 c.e. Sources state that, based 
on Rngog legs-pa’i shes-rab’s request for Madhyamaka teachings (dbu ma’i chos), 
Atiśa and his translator-disciple Nag-’tsho lo-tsā-ba tshul-khrims rgyal-ba (1011-1064) 
then translated Bhāviveka’s Blaze of Reasoning (rTog-ge ’bar-ba, Skt. Tarkajvālā)5 
                                                   
3 Las chen kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (2003:10): / lta ba gtso bor ston pa ni jo bo nyid kyis mdzad pa’i 
bden pa gnyis la ’jug pa dang / dbu ma’i man ngag la sogs pa yin la. Texts on the “view” (lta ba), 
along with practice (spyod pa) and integration (zung ’brel), belong to the textual (zhung) lineage of 
teachings. The textual lineage belongs to a broader classification that includes advice (gdams ngag) 
and special instructions (man ngag).   
4 Bden gnyis kyi rnam par bshad pa (fol. 2b7): sgom pa rtan la ’bebs pa’i dbang du byas na / dbu ma’i 
man ngag… 
5 See now Huanhuan and van der Kuijp (2014) for the historical and philological issues in the Tibetan 
translation of this text and other works of Bhāviveka.  
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commentary to his Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās at Lhasa’s main temple the ’Phrul- 
snang gtsug-lag-khang. In addition to this translation, Atiśa is said to have composed 
the greater and lesser Special Instructions on the Middle Way (dbu ma’i man ngag che 
chung). The “greater” special instructions is a reference to the Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa– 
madhyamakopadeśa (Tôh. no. 3930)6, while the “lesser” is the Madhyamakopadeśa 
(Tôh. no. 3929; also, no. 4468) translated below.7 However, according to the colophon 
of the canonical version of the Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa, this work was written in the great 
temple of Vikramaśīla, under the patronage of King Devapāla (Apple 2010:120). The 
colophon to the so–called short Dbu ma’i man ngag does mention that it was composed 
in the main temple of Lhasa and that Atiśa and Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba translated and 
edited the text together. Therefore, the Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa was composed first in 
India and then the Madhyamakopadeśa was composed years later in Tibet. As the 
Madhyamakopadeśa has similar content to some sections of the Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭa, 
Atiśa may have composed the Madhyamakopadeśa as a brief instruction based on 
extracts from the latter work. Atiśa may have used both texts to give lectures on 
Madhyamaka during his time in Lhasa.  
 
Translation of the Madhyamakopadésa, “Special Instructions of the 
Middle Way”8 
In the Indian language: madhyama-upadeśa-nāma  
In the Tibetan language: dbu ma’i man ngag ces bya ba [Special Instructions of the 
Middle Way]  
I bow down to the Protector of the World  
 
                                                   
6 A critical edition and Japanese translation of this work is found in Miyazaki (2007) and Apple 
(2010) provides an annotated English translation.   
7 Jo bo rje dpal ldan a ti sha'i rnam thar bka' gdams pha chos (2012: 1691.8): yang rngog gis zhus 
sna mdzad dbu ma’i chos zhus pas / dbu ma rtog ge ’bar ba gsungs / de’i man ngag che chung gnyis 
mdzad nas rnal ’byor pa la gzigs su phul bas/ nged la lkog tu khrid pa bzhin du bris ’dug cung yang 
zab drags gsung / de lo tsā bas bsgyur ba’i zhabs na / ra sa ’phrul snang gtsug lag khang chen du / 
/shākya’i dge slong rngog btsun legs shes yis / /gsol ba btab nas yi ger bkod pa yin / /zhes pa jo bo’i 
gsung yin /. Bka’ gdams chos ’byung gsal ba’i sgron me (2003:148): lha sar …rngog gis dbu mdzad 
pa’i bod ston kha cig la rim pa’i cho ga rgyas par gnang / rtog ge ’bar ba bsgyur ba’i zhu ba phul / jo 
bos gnang nas nag tshos tshang bar bsgyur / de’i zhar la dbu ma’i man ngag kyang mdzad /; Blue 
Annals (deb ther sngon po, 1984:316.15-17): Der rngog gis lo paṇ la zhu ba phul nas / rtog ge ’bar ba 
bsgyur / de’i man ngag tu dbu ma’i man ngag che chung gnyis mdzad / 
8 Madhyamakopadeśa, Derge Tanjur, volume Ki, folios 95b1-96a7. 
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I bow down to that supreme holy person,  
whose light rays of speech  
Opens the lotuses of the hearts  
Of all the deluded like me without exception. 
 
   The special instructions of the Mahāyāna’s Middle Way are as follows:  
Conventionally, all things, from the perspective of the deluded whose vision is narrow, 
including all presentations of cause and effect and so forth, are real according to how 
they appear. Ultimately or actually, when the conventional as it appears is closely 
examined and clarified by the great reasonings, one should thoroughly understand with 
certainty that even something the size of the tip of a hair that is split a hundred times 
cannot be grasped.  
   While sitting in a cross-legged position on a comfortable seat, [contemplate] for 
awhile as follows: there are two kinds of entities, those having form and those not 
having form. In this regard, those that have form are collections of minute particles. 
When these are closely examined and broken up according to their directional parts, 
not even the most subtle [part] remains and they are completely without appearance. 
That which does not have form is the mind. In regards to this, the past mind has ceased 
and perished. The mind of the future has not yet arisen or occurred. Even the mind of 
the present is extremely difficult to examine: it has no color and is devoid of shape, 
since it is similar to space, it is not established, and since it is free of unity and 
multiplicity, unproduced, and having a luminous nature and so forth, when it is 
analyzed and examined with the weapon of reasoning, one realizes that it is not 
established.  
   In this way, when those two are not established as having any nature at all and do 
not exist, the very wisdom which individually discriminates is not established either. 
For example, through the condition of fire occurring by rubbing two sticks together, 
the two sticks are burned up and become non-existent. Just as the very fire [D96a1] 
which has burned subsides by itself, likewise, when all specific and generally 
characterized things are established as non-existent, wisdom itself, without appearance 
and luminous, is not established with any nature at all. All faults such as laxity and 
excitement and so forth are eliminated. In this interval of meditation, consciousness 
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does not at all conceptualize, does not apprehend anything at all. All recollection and 
mental engagement are eliminated. Consciousness should reside in this way for as long 
as the enemies or thieves of signs and conceptual thought do not arise. When you wish 
to arise, slowly release from the cross-legged position and stand up. Then, with a mind 
which sees all things like illusions,9 do as many virtuous deeds as you are able with 
body, speech, and mind.  
   Accordingly, when one practices with devotion, for a long time, and 
uninterruptedly, then those with good fortune will see reality in this very life and all 
things will be directly realized, effortlessly and spontaneously, like the center of space. 
Through the attainment [of wisdom] after [meditation], all things are understood to be 
like illusions and so forth. From the point of time onwards when the vajra-like 
concentration has been realized, [Buddhas] will not have any subsequent attainment as 
they are settled in meditative equipoise at all times.   
   I will not speak here regarding the reasonings and scriptures that make statements 
such as, “If it is not like that, what is the difference from bodhisattvas?” Through the 
power of gathering the accumulations and making aspiration prayers for countless 
aeons for the welfare of others, [Buddhas] will become just as those who are to be 
taught wish [them to be]. There are many scriptures and reasonings [on this topic], but 
I will not elaborate upon them here.   
   The [text] called Special Instructions of the Middle Way composed by the paṇḍita 
Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna is completed. The Indian master himself and the great editor 
translator and monk, Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba, translated, edited, and set the final version 
at the ’Phrul-snang temple in Lhasa.   
 
The Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti of Prajñāmukti 
   Prajñāmukti’s Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti is a commentary on the base text of Atiśa’s 
Madhyamakopadeśa that provides glosses on individual words and phrases in the text, 
as well as citing various sūtras and śāstras to clarify points of Atiśa’s concise teaching. 
Prajñāmukti furnishes important glosses for apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa and madhyamaka 
among others. He also notes (D.122a) that he considers Atiśa’s Madhyamaka to be 
Apratiṣṭhānavada (rab tu mi gnas par smra ba). Prajñāmukti’s commentary provides 
                                                   
9 Literally, “with an illusion like mind.” 
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responses to questions regarding the relationship between the two realities and the 
interpretation of a Buddha’s awakening completely lacking any conceptuality. The 
understanding that it is impossible for a Buddha to have any conceptual knowledge, 
based on Mahāyāna Buddhist sūtras and supported by Candrakīrti’s 
Madhyamakāvatāra exegesis, is a vital point in the Madhyamaka system of Atiśa and 
his early Kadampa followers.10 Along these lines, Prajñāmukti will mention several 
times conventional valid cognition (tha snyad kyi tshad ma), implying that is has 
applicability merely in a worldly transactual context (Apple 2013, 2014).    
     The Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti is the only work in the Tibetan Tanjur by 
Prajñāmukti. The colophon mentions that he was an Indian preceptor (upādhyāya) and 
that he translated the text along with Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba. He was most likely a 
member of Atiśa’s entourage that accompanied Atiśa during his journeys throughout 
Tibet. In the following translation I have highlighted in bold print words and phrases 
that reference Atiśa’s Madhyamakopadeśa. 
 
Translation of the Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti (Dbu ma'i man ngag ces bya 
ba'i 'grel pa).11 
[116b7] In the Indian language: madhyama-upadeśavṛītti 
In the Tibetan language: dbu ma’i man ngag ces bya ba’i ’grel pa [Commentary on the 
Special Instructions of the Middle Way]  
I bow down to the Lord of the World (Lokeśvara).  
 
[117a1] Having paid homage to the bodhisattva 
   as a cause for increasing wholesome qualities  
   and eliminating the suffering of beings  
   I will clarify the Middle Way Special Instructions  
                                                   
10 On the late Indian subclassications of Madhyamaka into Māyopamādvayavāda (Tib. sgyu ma lta bu 
gnyis su med par smra ba), “the strand which maintains that [things] are one, inasmuch as they are 
like illusions,” and Apratiṣṭhānavada, “the strand which maintains that all things have so substance 
whatsoever,” see Almogi 2010. See Newland (1992) for how Gelukpa authors utilize Prajñāmukti in 
interpreting the relationship between the two realities. See Dunne (1996) on Candrakīrti’s 
understanding of the nonconceptual knowledge of a Buddha and Apple (2013) on Atiśa and early 
Kadampa authors on this issue.  
11 Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti, Tôh. no. 3931. Dergé Tanjur, vol. KI, folios 116v.7-123v.2. Tr. by the 




 Those who sink in the mud of saṃsāra  
 Due to mistaken conceptuality  
 Through relying on the path of special instructions  
 Will achieve perfect awakening  
 
 I will explain just a little of the special instructions.  
 
   Regarding this, the text stating “whose light rays of speech” and so forth is stated 
at the beginning as a homage to the object that possesses virtuous qualities. The 
intention [of the homage] is for the purpose of the most excellent Ācārya himself to 
understand the ultimate itself, to pacify obstacles of interruption, and to make a 
commitment to explain [the instructions]. This verse indicates two condensed purposes. 
Offering worship through paying homage and worship by declaring virtuous qualities, 
the excellent object of other virtuous qualities is conceived as one’s own purpose.  
The purpose for others is cause and result. For this, the text stating “whose light rays 
of speech” indicates the most excellent cause. The text stating, “Opens the lotuses of 
the hearts of all the deluded like me without exception” indicates the most 
excellent effect. The text stating “supreme holy person” indicates the end point of 
one’s own purpose. The [plural marker] rnams indicates many12. “Bow down” are 
words of paying homage.  
   I will now explain the meaning of the ancillaries. “Whose” is a word for an agent or 
as a general term clearly applies to only a Buddha as a support having abandoned other 
objects. This section makes offering by paying homage and worship to the qualities of 
a Buddha. It is like saying “oh pretty one” as a general word to interact with a cow for 
the purpose of milk. Stating “light rays of speech” indicates the light rays of body, 
speech, and mind. Like the lights of white, red, blue, or the sun and moon, the light 
when the sun rises clears away great black darkness, opens up flowers [117b] and so 
forth, ripens various medicines and fruits, pacifies the misery of touching cold frost 
and so forth, creates happiness for sentient beings who feel warmth, clarifies the path 
and what is not the path, as well as unclear objects, and subdues the brilliance of other 
                                                   
12 This indicates that Prajñāmukti’s text states “bow down to those supreme holy persons.”  
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lights such as stars and so forth. In a similar fashion, the light of the teaching of the 
inconceivable Dharma that liberates by means of the body, speech, and mind of the 
Bhagavan eliminates the darkness of misknowledge of sentient beings, opens up the 
lotus of the mind, completely ripens the unripened continuum, pacifies the harm of 
demons and so forth, pacifies the suffering of all sentient beings, establishes [them] in 
unsurpassable happiness, abandons and eliminates bad views, and subdues the 
brilliance of the maturing light of gods and so forth. Furthermore, it is also indicated by 
saying “eclipsing and so forth.”13 The text stating “light rays” demonstrates the 
activity of the agent.  The text stating “Opens” indicates the action which is done. 
Stating “me and so forth” is easy to understand as the Ācārya himself and so forth. 
“Deluded” means not directly realizing the meaning of suchness. The text states 
“all…without exception” because the compassion of the Bhagavan is not of limited 
scope but pervades everywhere and is engaged in for the purpose of all [sentient 
beings]. “Opens the lotuses of the hearts” means that the heart functions as support of 
the mind and is designated on the placed name of the support. Therefore, it is like 
saying “opens the lotuses of the minds.” Moreover, it is like a lotus. A lotus, when seen, 
produces joy and is a source for various kinds of scents and colors as well as honey and 
so forth. Although it is produced from mud, it is untainted by the mud, and is 
distinctively sublime. Likewise, the mind is the place for various kinds of joys and 
affections, provides the taste of the co-emergent nectar, [118a1] is the source of 
precious awakening and, although it has adventitious stains, is luminous by nature and 
pure. Further, “it is considered pure, just as water, gold and space are pure”14 and “The 
nature of the mind is the Buddha and one should not seek the Buddha elsewhere.”15 
The text stating “opens” is liken to how a lotus blossom opens and as the mind is 
                                                   
13 Prajñāmukti cites the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and his text reads mog mog por mdzad dang. AA I.8: 
śyāmīkaraṇatādīni śiṣyakhaḍgapathau ca yau / mahānuśaṃso dṛṅmārga aihikāmutrikairguṇaiḥ / /  
[8.] mog mog por byed la sogs dang / / slob ma bse ru’i lam gang dang / / ’di dang gzhan pa’i yon tan 
gyis / / phan yon che ba mthong ba’i lam / / 
14 Madhyāntavibhāgakārikā, I.17cd: abdhātukanakākāśaśuddhivacchuddhiriṣyate. Hoornaert, 2003 
page 157, note 6: “The comparison of the intrinscially pure nature of the mind with the intrinscially 
purity of water, gold, and space is used in e.g., MVK I.16 , MSA XI. 13 , XIII 16, 18 , YBh, T vol 30, 
70 I b28-c3, 748b 1 3- l 8 The parallel passage in PP quotes MVK I.16cd and MVK 1.21 -22 (see 
Eckel 1985, pp 57-59). 
15 A similar verse is found in the Ārya-ātajñāna-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra (’Phags pa ’da’ ka ye shes 




expanded to the five aspects of knowledge. Further, “One who apprehends, recites, 
practices, studies and writes with to respect others, their awareness blossoms as a lotus 
by sunlight.16 It is also taught that “If he has not applied himself to the five sciences,17 
even the supreme saint will never arrive at omniscience. Therefore, he makes effort in 
those [sciences], in order to criticize and care for others as well as for the sake of his 
own knowledge.” 18  When the text states “supreme holy person” his nature is 
comprised of perfect and compete abandonment and wisdom as well as having the 
nature of the three bodies. The text stating “I bow down to that” indicates making 
homage and the virtuous actions of body, speech and mind. This directly teaches the 
special instructions. Regarding this, the text stating “The special instructions of the 
Mahāyāna’s Middle Way are as follows” is summarized and indicated through the 
cause, which is the three wisdoms of study, reflection, and meditation. With respect to 
this, vehicle is the vehicle of cause and the vehicle of effect and the cause is because of 
going from this path of the bodhisattvas. It is further explained in the manner of the 
vehicle of mantra and in the vehicle of the perfections as explained from others. The 
vehicle of the result has the nature of the three bodies because it is to be traversed. 
Great means the magnanimity of wisdom and compassion and so forth. In this regard, 
it is taught that “great in giving, great in mind, great in power.”19 In that, great wisdom 
understands all things to be like an illusion and [118b] is not attached to anything at all. 
Great compassion connects means and wisdom continuously for the benefit of sentient 
                                                   
16 Unidentified verse also cited by Vimalamitra, Kramapraveśikabhāvanārtha (Rim gyis 'jug pa'i 
sgom don): gang zhig ’dzin dang ’don dang spyod pa dang / / gzhan la ’dri zhing thos pa ’dzin byed 
dang/ / de yi blo ni nyi ma’i ’od zer gyis/ /padma bzhin du rnam par kha ’byed do / / 
17 The five sciences (pañcavidyā): linguistic science (śabda), logical science (hetu), ‘inner’ science 
(adhyātma), medical science (cikitsā), and the science of fine arts and crafts (śilapakarmasthāna). 
Mahāvyutpatti, 1554–59. The ‘inner’ science is the study and practice of the Buddha’s teachings. See 
Gold 2007: 11–16, 20–24. 
18 Thurman et al, 2004:141: “If he has not applied himself to the five sciences, even the supreme saint 
will never arrive at omniscience. Therefore, he makes effort in those (sciences), in order to criticize 
and care for others as well as for the sake of his own knowledge.” MSA 11.60: vidyāsthāne 
pañcavidhe yogamakṛtvā sarvajñatvaṃ naiti kathaṃcitparamāryaḥ / ityanyeṣāṃ nigrahaṇānu- 
grahaṇāya svājñārthaṃ vā tatra karotyeva sa yogam // MSA 11.60 // Tibetan: rig pa’i gnas lnga dag 
la mkhas par ma byas na / / ’phags mchos gyis kyang thams cad mkhyen nyid thob par mi ’gyur te de 
phyir gzhan dag tshar gcad rjes su gsung phyir ram bdag nyid goms par bya phyir de la de brtson byed. 
Levi: S’il ne s’est pas appliqué aux cinq Sciences classiques, le Saint par excellence n’arrive 
absolument pas à ]’Omniscience; aussi il y met son Application pour empêcher les autres, ou pour les 
seconder, ou pour reconnaître par soi-même.  




beings and is the path of the bodhisattvas. As wisdom, compassion, and so forth are 
small, it is called the “small vehicle.”20 With respect to this, it is taught that “Without 
method, disconnected from wisdom, one falls into being a śrāvaka.” Therefore, a 
śrāvaka falls to the extreme of nirvāṇa and by directly perceiving nirvāṇa with 
remnant of the aggregates and without remnant of the aggregates forsakes the benefit 
of sentient beings. Ordinary individuals fall to the extreme of saṃsāra and experience 
various sufferings. The bodhisattva abandons these extremes. With great wisdom they 
do not abide in the extreme of saṃsāra, with great compassion they do not abide in the 
extreme of nirvāṇa, this is called the “nirvāṇa which does not abide (apratiṣṭhita) in the 
two extremes.” Moreover, for non-abiding nirvāṇa, it is taught that “the means of 
achieving [the state of] lord of the world depends upon a continuum which has 
indivisible emptiness and compassion, this is explained by all the Buddhas.” Therefore, 
the great vehicle is wisdom and compassion. “Middle” means free from all extremes 
and middle has the meaning of heart/essence. With regards to the word and the ultimate 
meaning, the real middle will be explained below on the two realities. The word 
“middle” (dbu ma) is a sound which expresses middle and is only a designated term for 
abandoning the two extremes. The “special instructions of this” signifies to greatly 
cherish and as one realizes great meaning with little effort therefore it is special 
instructions. “To meditate” signifies practice and will be explained below. “From 
beginningless time” signifies saṃsāra without beginning and without end. Clinging to 
things as real means to fixate upon something as truly existent, like subjects and objects 
and so forth. “To posit the two realities” indicates in reality they are one and 
non-differentiated. If [the two realities] were one, just as conventionalities are 
abandoned, so the ultimate also would be abandoned; just as conventionalities have 
differences, [119a] so the ultimate would have differences; just as the conventionalities 
are defiled, so the ultimate also would be defiled. 21  If [ultimate reality and 
conventional reality] were different, they would not be the real nature (chos nyid) and 
the possessor of the real nature (chos can), and [realization of ultimate reality] would 
not overcome the marks of conditioned things; cultivation of the path would also be 
                                                   
20 The text mentions the “small vehicle” (theg pa chung) as opposed to the more common Tibetan 
translation of “inferior vehicle” (theg dman) for hīnayāna.  
21 Translation based on Newland 1992:68.  
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meaningless.22 For this reason, it is inexpressible as anything other than suchness. A 
detailed explanation is taught from other sources. Morevover, if it is asked why, it is 
said, “the defining characteristic of the conditioned realm and of the ultimate are free 
from identity and difference. Those who conceptualize identity and difference are 
improperly oriented.”23 Further, the meaning is briefly summarized by teaching that it 
is liberated from other and suchness like the whiteness of conch shells and so forth.  
   To explain in detail the elements: the text stating “Conventionally, all things” and 
so forth indicates that through the wisdom which arises from study and reflection one 
trains in the modes of the two realities. Regarding this, conventional means deluded 
awareness that is obscured for the object of reality, just as it is explained elsewhere. 
“All things” means all without exception and is easy to understand. “The deluded 
whose vision is narrow” are those who do not see reality. “From the perspective of” 
means what is applied with the thought of attachment. “Cause and effect and so 
forth” are the aggregates, elements, sense-spheres, and so forth. “According to how 
they appear” means that they are pleasing when unexamined, appearing while having 
no self-nature. Along these lines it is taught that, “Convinced that impermanent things 
are like the moon’s reflection in water, neither true nor false, one is not carried away 
by philosophical views.’’24 “Real” means that it is real in terms of causal efficacy, real 
as mere appearance, and when examined is not established as real. Along these lines it 
is taught that, “When examined by reason, [something] is not real. Otherwise, it is real. 
Therefore, how can it be contradictory for the very same entity to be both real and 
unreal?”25 “Ultimately” [119b] is correct wisdom and since it is undeceiving towards 
a real object, since it issues forth a holy result, and since it is to be sought after, it is the 
utmost, and that, although pleasing when examined, is not established. “The 
conventional as it appears” are external and internal entities. “The great reasonings” 
are reasonings that, because they are not deceptive for the proof of what is to be proven, 
are reasonings and are implicitly if [something] exists connected with natures other 
                                                   
22 Translation also found in Newland 1992:64.  
23 Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra  III.6; See Mathes 2008:79.  
24 Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, verse 45: gang rten {brten} nas dnogs po rnams / /chu yi zla ba lta bur ni / yang dag 
ma yin log min par/ /’dod pa de dag lhas {em. ltas} mi phrogs {var. ’phrogs} /  The reading in 45a, 
rten, follows the paracanonical  edition of Pa tshab’s translation. See Scherrer-Schaub 1991:15.  
25 Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti (Eckel 1987:172) slightly differs: rigs pas brtags na bden ma yin / / de las 
gzhan du bden pa yin {Prajñāmukti ste} / / des na gcig la bden nyid dang / / mi bden par ni ji ltar ’gal 
// {Prajñāmukti des na dngos po gcig nyid la / / bden dang bden ji ltar ’gal } See also Eckel 1987:86.  
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than conventional valid cognition. Great are great that rely on conventional reasoning 
such as smoke and so forth and those are undeceptive for conventional objects. Here, it 
is great because it is undeceptive for the object of reality, subjugates all distinctions of 
entities, pacifies all demons of wrong views, and negates all the extremes of conceptual 
proliferations. For that reason it is taught that, “The emptiness of all the Victorious 
Ones is to definitely eliminate all views.”26 “By the [great reasoning]s” indicates four 
types [of reasoning].  In this regard, “that which is dependently arisen is without 
cessation, without production,”27 and “Not from itself, not from another, not from both, 
nor without cause: Never in any way is there any existing thing which has arisen,”28 
and “Many do not produce one, many do not produce many, one does not produce 
many, and one does not produce one,”29 and “Those entities postulated as real by 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools have in reality not intrinsic nature, because they 
possess neither a single nor a plural nature, like a reflection.”30 This is merely a single 
fraction of formal reasoning. A more extensive explanation is in other [texts]. 
Eradicating movement is by distinguishing the directional parts which when examined 
may consist of sixteen or ten parts and so forth. “Something the size of the tip of a 
hair that is split a hundred times” is a measurement which is extremely subtle. “To 
thoroughly understand” indicates that through the wisdom of study and reflection one 
should train in the principle of the two realities for all dharmas.  Furthermore, the 
preliminaries of training [120a] are the wisdoms [arising from] study and reflection 
and having studied and reflected, one then meditates. Further, this is indicated by 
stating, “For those of great learning the happy place of aging and growing old is in the 
                                                   
26 Prajñāmukti, 119b3-4: rgyal ba kun kyi stong nyid ni / /lta kun nges par sel ba yin . MMK 13.8ab: 
Klu’i rgyal mtshan (ca. 8th century) Tibetan translation: rgyal ba rnams kyis stong pa nyid / / lta kun 
nges par ’byung bar gsungs/  Sanskrit: śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ (Katsura and 
Siderits 2013:145) 
27 MMK, dedicatory verse a, c:  anirodham anutpādam…yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ…  
28 MMK, 1.1: na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva 
cana ke cana // Translation Katsura and Siderits 2013:18. In the Bodhipathapradīpapañjika 
(Sherburne 2000:234) cited as example of diamond-particle proof.  
29 Jñānagarbha, Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā (verse 14, translation Eckel 1987: 80): du mas dngos po 
gcig mi byed / /du mas du ma byed ma yin / /gcig gis du ma’i dngos mi byed / /gcig gis gcig byed pa 
yang min //  
30Śāntarakṣita, Madhyamakālaṃkāra 1: niḥsvabhāvā amī tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena 
viyogāt pratibimbavat / / (Ichigō 1989:191). Cited also in the Bodhipathapradīpapañjika (Sherburne 
2000:234). Proof which refutes identity and multiplicity.  
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inner purity of the forest,31” and “previously having sought correct knowledge…32  
   Now, the stages of meditating on the special instructions will be indicated. Special 
instructions has been explained earlier. Meditation has three aspects: the application, 
the actual [session of practice], and the post-concentrative state. “Sitting in a 
cross-legged position on a comfortable seat” indicates the application of 
concentration while thinking to not abandon any sentient being and with immeasurable 
great effort having the intention to achieve great awakening. Stating “[contemplate] 
for awhile as follows: there are two kinds of entities” is to examine. “Those having 
form and those not having form” since it is contradictory for a characteristic to abide 
and abandon the mutually established, [it] pervades all entities and eliminates a third 
alternative. The text stating “In this regard, those that have form” indicates that 
forms are not established, and further, are accepted as cause and effect. For this, the 
cause is the four elements which are subtle atoms and furthermore, by observing many 
parts, a singular part-less [atom] is not established. In not establishing a singularity, a 
multiplicity is also not established, nor is multiplicity the nature of one and so forth. In 
this way, in examining the singular and the multiple other alternatives are not 
established. As it is explained, “There is not an entity which has a classification other 
than singularity or multiplicity, since these two [classifications] stand in the relation of 
mutual exclusion.”33 In this way, when subtle atoms are not established, the form 
which is the result is also not established, similar to when there is not a seed, a sprout is 
refuted. Furthermore, “In this way, because a creator does not exist, substantial entities 
and so forth are eliminated.”34 The text stating “completely without appearance” 
indicates that appearances are signs and means that signs do not occur since they are 
the cause of bondage. Now, since the signs of the mind are themselves taught not to be 
observed, the text mentions “That which does not have form.” [120b] Regarding that, 
since causal efficacy is momentary, to make subdivisions of the momentary 
furthermore, the past does not exist since it is a perished entity. If something exists, it 
                                                   
31 Cited in Bodhibhadra’s Samādhisambhāraparivarta (ting nge 'dzin gyi tsogs kyi le'u zhes bya ba, 
81b) as from the ’phags pa nyan thos kyi so sor thar pa’i mdo. 
32 Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti (P, fols. 83b8-84a3; D, fol. 83a4-6; S, vol. 62, p. 973.7-14). 
33 Madhyamakālamkāra 62 (Ichigō 1989:211): gcig dang du ma ma gtogs par / /rnam pa gzhan dang 
ldan pa yi / /dngos po mi rung ’di gnyis ni / /phan tsun spangs te gnas phyir ro / / 
34 Śrīgupta, Tattvāvatāravṛtti (De kho na la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa), 40a. Tôh. no. 3892. Dergé Tanjur, vol. 
HA, folios 39v.4-43v.5. 
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will be right now in the present. The future does not exist since is it an unproduced 
entity. If something exists, it would not change in the future as it is in the present. 
Therefore, the text states “the mind of the present is extremely difficult to 
examine.” Difficult to examine since when it is searched for it does not exist as an 
observable object. It has no color and is devoid of shape means that is it devoid of 
blue, gold, etc. and long, short, and so forth. Free of unity and multiplicity means, as 
explained elsewhere, that it is unable to withstand analysis through [the relations of] 
unity and multiplicity. Unproduced since existence and non-existence are unproduced. 
Having a luminous nature since with respect to itself it is non-conceptual and free 
from defilements, it is naturally luminous. Stating “and so forth” indicates that it is 
like an illusion since it is devoid of being produced from the four extremes, devoid of 
being produced from itself, from another, from both, or without a cause, and in reality 
has passed beyond the extremes of existence and non-existence. With the weapon of 
reasoning indicates that reasoning itself cuts through and splits things apart similar to a 
weapon. The Jñānālokālaṃkāra states, “I pay homage to the Buddhas who continually 
have purified all dharmas, unfounded mind and omniscient for all dharmas, through not 
having an object of observation.”35 One realizes that it is not established by 
understanding of the application. The text stating “In this way, when those two are 
not established” is indicated through concentration. Those two are that which has 
form and that which does not have form. Not established means not established 
ultimately and negates other conceptual thoughts. The very wisdom which 
individually discriminates is not established either negates the cognition itself. 
Since wisdom is a particularity of an entity, when an entity is not established, the very 
wisdom itself is also not established just like when a tree is not established the wood 
and so forth are negated. [121a] As it is said, “In this regard, a fire which burns fuel, 
having burned its fuel does not remain.” Furthermore, according to the principle 
summarized above, when mind is not established, then mental factors are also not 
established like the sun and its rays of light. As it is said, “Because the mind is refuted 
                                                   
35 Prajñāmukti’s text reads: sangs rgyas rnams kyis nam yang ni / /gtan du chos rnams thams cad dag 
/ sems ma rnyed cing chos mkhyen pa/ /dmigs mi mnga’ la phyag ’tshal bstod / / Cited in 
Madhyamakāloka, D 3887, 240b.  Differs but close to Jñānālokālaṃkāra JAA, p.73: cittaṃ na 
labdhaṃ buddhehi atyantāya kadācana / sarvadharmā ca sarvajña nirālamba namo ’stu te // 30 // 
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in this way, the mental factors are also eliminated.”36 The text stating, “For example, 
through the condition of fire occurring by rubbing two sticks together” is 
explained by means of scripture (āgama). The wisdom which individually 
discriminates is like a fire and all conceptual thought is taught to be like fire-wood. As 
it is said, “all the dharmas of beings are asserted to be the fire-wood of consciousness. 
Those will become pacified when burned by the fire of analysis” and “Through burning 
all non-virtuous conceptual thought in the fires of individual discrimination.” All 
specific and generally characterized things: generally characterized things are 
empty, selfless, and so forth. The specific character of things is happiness, anguish, and 
so forth. Wisdom itself is the very wisdom of meditative equipoise. Freedom from 
hatred37 means to be devoid of the conceptual thoughts of self and other. Furthermore, 
it is taught that “When not subsequently perceiving knowledge, objects of knowledge, 
or self then because signs do not emerge, one’s concentration is firm, one does not get 
up.”38 Luminosity because it is naturally pure. Free from extremes signifies being 
free from permanence, annihilation, and so forth. Not established at all is due to not 
being established through [reasonings like] neither-one-nor-many and so forth. All 
faults such as laxity and excitement and so forth are faults of concentration.  
Furthermore, laxity is internal lethargy. Excitement is mental distraction. “And so 
forth” indicates other signs. In this interval indicates an interval of meditative 
equipoise. To not apprehend anything at all is to be free from the concepts of 
apprehended object and apprehending subject. All recollection and mental 
engagement are eliminated means that one abandons the concepts which objectify the 
past and the future. [121b] One abandons pleasant forms and so forth. Enemies of 
conceptual thought or enemies who steal, or like thieves indicates that [signs] are 
enemies since they scatter the treasure of concentration and therefore these should be 
abandoned by the spy-watcher of conscientiousness. Further, as it is said, “Fasten the 
wayward elephant-like mind with recollection’s rope to the post of the [meditation] 
                                                   
36 Śrīgupta, Tattvāvatāravṛtti (De kho na la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa, D 40b-41a): sems ni de ltar [41a] med 
pa'i phyir / /sems las byung ba rnams kyang bsal / {Prajñāmukti reads bkag pa’i phyir /} 
37 This indicates that Prajñāmukti’s text states “freedom from hatred.”  
38 Jñānagarbha, Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā, (Eckel, p.101, vs. 39; Tibetan Eckel 1987:187), Tib.,: 
gang tshe shes dang shes bya dang / / bdag nyid rjes su mi mthong ba // de ni mtshan ma mi 'byung 
phyir // gnas pa brtan phyir mi bzheng so / / Prajñāmukti citation differs: gang tshe shes dang shes bya 
dag / /bdag nyid rjes su mi mthong bas / /de tshe mtshan ma mi ’byung phyir / /gnas pa brten phyir mi 
bzhengs so //  
17 
 
object; Then gradually bring it under control Using the hook of Wisdom.” 39 
Conventionally, it is like refuting the particularities of rising body hairs when 
perceiving a large fire.40 Therefore, it is unreasonable to generate dual appearances 
when accumulating the two collections [of merit and wisdom]. 
   [Question:] If the Bhagavan is like a master of an illusion who understands illusion 
as illusion and attachment to reality does not arise, is reality non-mistaken? [Response] 
In that case, those who adhere to a Self understand the Self as a permanent Self, 
śrāvakas, as well, understand entities as real entities, and those who adhere to 
Mind-only understand self-cognizing consciousness (rang rig, svasaṃvedana) as the 
ultimate which is the non-mistaken reality, as it has been said. 
   [Question] If the Self and so forth are entities which do not abide as objects of 
knowledge, and since it is invalidated by a valid cognition and it is not established by a 
valid cognition, by exhausting as a mere imputation, apprehending them would be 
mistaken, but as a mere illusion that is established by valid cognition and not 
invalidated by valid cognition, would not cognition according to that fact not be 
mistaken? [Response] That is unreasonable. The object of knowledge of non-erroneous 
wisdom that abides like an illusion is not anywhere established and the objects of 
knowledge of non-mistaken knowledge do not abide like blurred vision and so forth. 
   [Question:] If it is the case, if not understanding the conventional just as it appears, 
the wisdom of total omniscience would not occur? In that case, since illusory elephants, 
blurred vision, and so forth would not appear to the direct perception of faultless 
sense-faculties, there would not be direct perception. Therefore, it is unreasonable for 
the wisdom which abandons mistakes to be false. When there is false appearance, then 
even the wisdom itself would be mistaken, like understanding water in a mirage.  
[Response:] If it is not like that, then an object in this regard would be a real entity and 
any knowledge [122a] would not be mistaken. Therefore, how can signs of dual 
appearance occur for final complete wisdom? Dual appearances and mistaken signs are 
different as mere names but are not different objects. As it said from a sūtra, “Subhūti, 
                                                   
39 Bhāviveka, Madhyamakahṛdayam, 3.16. Skt. nibadhyālambanastambhe smṛtirajjvā manogajam / 
unmārgacāriṇaṃ kuryāt prajñāṅkuśavasaṃ śanaiḥ. Tib. yid kyi glang po log ’gro ba / dmigs pa’i ka 
ba brtan po la / dran pa’i thag pas nges bcings nas / shes rab lcags kyus rim dbang bya. English 
translation Engle 2009:91-92. Prajñāmukti’s citation differs in the first line: sems kyi glang po 
log ’gro ba  
40 Derge reads ma chen po. 
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forms are signs, sounds are signs.” Furthermore, “The samādhi of the Buddhas, the 
Great Sages, and the Conqueror’s children has abandoned signs. Signs are for those of 
the world,”41 and so forth.  
   [Question:] If it is the case through fear, the fright of worry, that the conventional is 
non-existent, when the conventional does not appear for wisdom, would the appearance 
be evident? [Reply:] That is unreasonable. By illuminating the non-appearance, since 
there is no entailment, there would not be an ascertainment. It is like the double moon, 
blurred vision, and so forth that does not appear to the knowledge of faultless 
sense-faculties. That knowledge does not illuminate them. When examined by insight 
and wisdom, since any dharma, truth, falsity, existence, or non-existence does not 
abide, it is called “non-abiding Madhyamaka.”  
   As it is said, “those whose intellect transcends existence and non-existence and 
does not abide [in any extremes], realize the meaning of ‘condition,’ which is profound 
and non-perceived.”42 With this is also explained the stages of study and reflection. 
Contrary to this, because all conventionalities abide as objects of conventional valid 
cognition, [they] are not refuted. Concentration is one-pointedness of mind on an 
object of observation and it has unhindered power as a cause to immediately achieve 
the inconceivable three bodies [of a Buddha]. Stating “When one has realized [the 
vajra-like concentration] onwards,” means that from the point onwards of attaining 
perfect complete buddhahood since it is identical with awakening although there are 
distinctions of wisdom, the realm of reality (dharmadhātu) is naturally one. Although 
there are different rivers of the Ganges, Sindhu, Pakṣu, and so forth, they are naturally 
one with the great ocean. As it is said, “Separate lineages are not proper, because the 
dharmadhātu does not have distinctions. [122b] The divisions are declared by 
                                                   
41 Cited from the Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi tantra.  
42 Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, verse 1. Dbu ma’i man nga gi ’bum reads: gang blo yod dang med pa las / /rnam 
par ’das shing mi gnas pa / / de dag zab mo dmigs med pa’i {var. yi} / /rkyen gyi don la rnam par 
bsgsoms / The citation of this verse is from the Tibetan translation by Ye shes sde (ninth century) of 
the commentary, the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā-vṛtti of Candrakīrti. The Tibetan translation by Pa tshab nyi ma 
grags of the this verse from the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā differs. See Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 7, 24-25. The verse is 
preserved in Sanskrit in the Sekoddeśaṭīkā (Scherrer-Schaub 1991:116n42): asti-nāsti-vyatikrāntā 
buddhir yeṣāṃ nirāśraya / gambhīras tair nirālambaḥ pratyayārtho vibhāyate / The commentary to 
this verse in the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā-vṛtti (Scherrer Schaub 1991:24; P 4a6-7) mentions that “those who have 
meditated on emptiness in previous lives, as they have understood dependent-arising and have the 
seed for the vision of emptiness, have great power… (gang dag ’das pa’i srid pa na stong pa nyid la 
goms pa de dag rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba rtogs shing stong pa nyid mthong ba’i sa bon yod pa’i 
phyir mthu che ba yin te / ) 
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distinguishing the supported dharmas.” 43  [Buddhahood] does not have a 
post-contemplative state because signs no longer occur.  [At all] times means 
before, after, and so forth. In meditative equipoise signifies not wavering from the 
realm of reality.  As it is said, “When an elephant sits, [he] sits evenly.  When an 
elephant arises, [he] arises evenly.”   
   Stating “If it is not like that” means if it is the case that signs of dualistic 
appearance occur. Without difference means without difference from abiding in the 
path of training while not abandoning the proliferation into mistaken notions of 
apprehended object and apprehending subject, and because [one’s status] will not be 
totally the same as awakening, it is unacceptable as signs of dual appearance will occur. 
As it is said, “Awakening, the characteristic [of which is similar to that] of space, is due 
to the abandonment of all signs (mtshan ma).”44 Furthermore, since it is taught that, 
“Subhūti, wisdom does not have an object.  If there exists an object for wisdom, then 
wisdom will not be understood,” how can signs occur?   
   One may think, “As there will be the continuous appearance of wisdom when dual 
appearances no longer occur, then the making of aspirational prayers and the gathering 
of the accumulations is pointless.” Here, the statement for the welfare of others 
indicates that the two Buddha bodies of form occur from the non-conceptual state and 
perform inconceivable deeds for the purpose of sentient beings. Although not having 
conceptuality, it is not contradictory for the aims of sentient beings to occur. It is like 
waves emerging from the ocean, like light emerging from the sun, and like wishes and 
hopes being made possible from a wish-fulfilling jewel. Compared to other [things], 
the example of a stupa and so forth, although not having conceptual thought,  are 
indicated to arise for the welfare of sentient beings. Reasoning is a valid cognition 
which invalidates. Scripture is the word of the Buddha. I will not speak here signifies 
having concern with being too verbose. Welfare of others means mundane and 
supermundane benefit. Countless aeons signifies beyond calculation. The 
accumulations means the benefit of the cause which is the accumulation of merit and 
                                                   
43 Abhisamayālaṃkāra I.39: dharmma-dhātor asaṃbhedāt gotrabhedo na yujyata / ādheya-dharmma- 
bhedāt tu tad-bhedaḥ parigṛiyata. Sparham Volume 1, pp. 85-85. Cited also in Atiśa’s Bodhipatha- 
pradīpapañjika (Sherburne 2000:116).  
44 Prajñāmukti reads mtshan ma for kun tu rtog pa. Cf. Miyazaki 2007:8n6, Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi, 
D (494) tha 226b7-227a1: byang chub nam mkha’i mtshan nyid do kun tu rtog pa thams cad spangs / 
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wisdom. Making aspiration prayers [123a] is for the welfare of others. Those who 
are to be taught for the eyes and so forth of pure minds. Just as those…wish signifies 
whichever [teaching] will appear as the essence of whichever discipline and in 
accordance with various reasonings will be exactly according to the inclination. As it is 
said, “Various practices are taught to sentient beings who have diverse inclinations. If 
one is not inclined to the teaching of profound reality, then one should refrain from 
reviling and be endowed with inconceivable reality.” Actually, the Bhagavan does not 
have a Buddha-body, etc. and does not have signs of dual appearance. Moreover, [the 
Buddha] never departs from the realm of reality and remains in a non-conceptual state. 
As it is taught, “Whoever sees me as visible matter…”45 Therefore, the Dharma-body 
is just like space. Although any distinctions of boundary, center, various colors and so 
forth do not exist in space, sentient beings conceptualize multiple distinctions of 
boundaries, center, blue, and yellow.  
   [Question:] If it is the case that the form-body and so forth does not have 
conceptual thought, then how can this be suitable to carry out the welfare of sentient 
beings? [Reply:] The meaning of this has already been explained. Even though the sun 
does not have conceptual thought various rays of light emerge from it and it illuminates 
things. The very disk of the sun is not light rays. If the disk of the sun itself were light 
rays then it would remain in the inside of a house, etc. and the very object and the disk 
itself would be different. The light rays themselves are not the disk of the sun. If the 
light rays themselves were then they would remain in space itself and would not 
illuminate all entities. Therefore, even though the light rays are not the sun disk, the 
light rays emerge from it and illuminate all entities. For this reason, since a sūtra states, 
“The Buddha is like space and sentient beings are like a mountain,” it is inconceivable.  
 
 The intention of Dīpaṃkara [123b] is difficult to measure and  
 The great meaning of Madhyamaka is not an object of the intellect.  
 Prajñāmukti has clearly described the special instructions  
                                                   
45 “Whoever sees me as visible matter, whoever understands me as sound, has entered into a wrong 
path; that person will not see me. The buddhas are the dharmakāya; the ‘leaders’ see reality 
(dharmatā).” Vajracchedikā, 26, k.1–2ab: yo māṃ rūpeṇa cādrākṣur yo māṃ ghoṣeṇa cānvaguḥ / 




 For the purpose of teaching those without knowledge who wish for an 
explanation.  
 
 May one who has attained the merit of this virtue  
 attain the status of awakening  
 from having the precious teaching stay in the world  
 remaining for as long as the earth, water, fire, wind, and space. 
 
   The commentary of the special instructions of the Middle Way composed by the 
Paṇḍita Prajñāmukti is concluded. The Indian preceptor (upādhyāya) Prajñāmukti 
himself and the monk Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba translated, corrected and edited [the text]. 
 
Collection on the Two Realities  (bden gnyis kyi ’bum)  
   The translation which follows consists of an anonymous Kadampa commentary on 
Atiśa’s Madhyamakopadésa entitled on the manuscript’s title page Bden gnyis kyi ’bum 
“Collection on the Two Realities.” The manuscript of the commentary is a facsimile 
reprint located in the recently published “Collected Works of the Bka’-gdams-pas” 
(bka’ gdams gsung ’bum). This collection consists of a number of lost Tibetan 
manuscripts that were recovered from temples within Drepung (’bras spungs) and Sera 
monasteries outside of Lhasa in 2003. Currently comprised of over ninety volumes 
(with plans for another thirty volumes), the collection contains works related to 
Buddhist scholastic topics such as Madhyamaka (dbu ma), Pramāṇa (tshad ma), and 
Abhidharma (chos mngon pa) by Tibetan authors ranging from the late tenth century 
up to the early fifteenth century who are generally considered Kadampa 
(bka’-gdams-pa) authors. The volumes of these handwritten manuscripts were 
purportedly a part of the library of the fourth Tsang king, Kar-ma bstan-skyong 
dbang-po (r. 1622–1642). 
   The manuscript of the Bden gnyis kyi ’bum is from the monastic library of Drepung 
according to the Bibliography of the Rare Texts that Reside at Drepung Monastery 
(’bras spungs dgon du bzhugs su gsol ba'i dpe rnying dkar chag). In that catalog, the 
Bden gnyis kyi ’bum is listed under manuscript #015400 as Bden gnyis kyi ’bum zhes pa 
jo bo’i dbu ma bden gnyis kyi ’grel ba. Although the title on the manuscript and the 
22 
 
catalog listing imply that the content is related to Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra, as the 
content clearly illustrates in the following translation, the text comments on Atiśa’s 
Madhyamakopadésa.  However, the first folio of the translation does focus on content 
related to the Satyadvayāvatāra and its title. I think this is because the first folio of the 
Bden gnyis kyi ’bum was either wrongly copied, or misplaced, and should be the first 
folio that precedes the content of the manuscript currently entitled  Dbu ma’i man 
ngag gi ’bum “Collection of Madhyamaka Special Instruction,” whose actual content is 
a brief commentary on Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra (translation in Apple 2013). The first 
folios of these two manuscripts were switched at some point in their history.  
   The manuscript of the Bden gnyis kyi ’bum consists of eighteen folios (Roman pp. 
335–369), eight lines per page written in clear Tibetan headless cursive script (dbu 
med). The handwriting contains a number of archaic abbreviations in which some parts 
of the text are difficult to discern. The manuscript has the following orthographic 
characteristics: 
● Consistent use of tsheg before a shad; 
● Palatalisation of ma by ya btags before vowels i and e (e.g. myed, myin); 
● Use of superabundant ’a rjes ’jug (e.g. mdo’, dbu’ ma ba); 
● The use of double shad to mark a new section of the commentary; 
● Consistent spelling of lasogs pa for la sogs pa; 
● Archaic transcription for Sanskrit terms (e.g. bu ta for buddha).  
   The text is found in volume 19 of the Bka’ gdams gsung ’bum published by Dpal 
brtsegs bod yig dpe rnyig zhib ’jug khang (2003). Volume 19 contains an 
Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentary by ’Chus Dar-ma brtson-’grus (1117– 1192) and five 
anonymous works on early Tibetan Madhyamaka. The early Kadam Madhyamaka 
works in this volume include: 
● Dbu ma la ’jug pa’i bsdus don (6 fols., Roman number pp. 247–317). A brief 
topical outline to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. 
● Bden gnyis rnam bshad ṭik dang bcas pa (35 fols., Roman number pp. 247–316). 
A commentary on Śāntarakṣita’s Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā (Toh. #3883). 
● Dbu ma’i man ngag gi bshad pa, Pu to yab sras kyi lugs (9 fols., pp. 317–334). A 
short work explaining the Madhyamaka special instructions of Po-ta-ba rin-chen 
gsal (1027–1105) and his spiritual son Sha-ra-ba yon-tan grags (1070–1141). 
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● Dbu ma bden gnyis kyi ’bum (18 fols., pp. 335–369). The text of the following 
translation.  
● Dbu ma’i man ngag gi ’bum, Bden chung gi ’bum (16 fols., pp. 371–401). A 
commentary on Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra. Introduced and translated in Apple 
2013.  
   The Kadampa author of Collection on the Two Realities (bden gnyis kyi ’bum) was 
affliated with the monastic center of Reting (Ra sgreng = Rwa sgreng) founded 
by ’Brom-ston rgyal-ba’i ’byung-gnas (1004/1005-1064), also known as Dge-bshes 
Ston-pa, in 1056/1057. The author explicitly mentions Reting three times in the 
commentary (fol. 1b, 4a1, 14a). The commentary preserves a tradition of Atiśa’s 
Madhyamaka that was upheld at Reting during the late eleventh to twelfth centuries.  
The author mentions a number of Kadampa figures in the commentary such as 
dGon-pa-ba dbang-phyug rgyal-mtshan (1016–1083), Po-to-pa rin-chen-gsal (1027- 
1105), Rnal-’byor-pa chen-po byang-chub rin-chen (1015-1078), and Spyan snga tshul 
khrims ’bar (1038-1103), who were all affliated with Reting at some point in their 
lives.  
   The Collection on the Two Realities contains a number of important historical 
anecdotes, linguistic points, and philosophical discussions. In terms of historical 
anecdotes, the commentary notes in its beginning section that Atiśa had a dispute with 
Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 970-1030), traditionally considered to be one of Atiśa’s teachers. 
Tibetans ususally mention a pious story of King Lha bla-ma Ye-shes ’od offering his 
head’s weight in gold as ransom for Atiśa to come to Tibet (see Schaeffer et al 
2013:176-181), but the Collection on the Two Realities anecdote presents an alternative 
view from Atiśa’s side, indicating a disagreement based on the fact that the Yogācāra 
Ratnākaraśānti did not approve of Atiśa’s teaching of Madhyamaka. A traditional 
biography of Atiśa attributed to ’Brom-ston-pa Rgyal-ba’i byung gnas (2012:45-46) 
states that Atiśa first received Madhyamaka teachings under the tantric yogin 
Avadhūtipa with whom he studied for seven years. The biography mentions that Atiśa 
learned the Madhyamaka principles of subtle cause and effect under Avadhūtipa, a 
point specifically mentioned in the Collection on the Two Realities (fol. 7b). Atiśa’s 
study of Madhyamaka under Avadhūtipa is also supported by the colophon to the 
Sūtrasamuccayasañcayārtha, which mentions that he received the special instruction 
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(upadeśa) of apratiṣṭhita [madhyamaka] darśana under Avadhūtipa.46 After study 
under Avadhūtipa, Atiśa learned the Yogacāra-madhyamaka system under 
Ratnākaraśānti based on this teacher’s commentary to the Aṣṭasahāsrikāprajñā- 
pāramitā. However, this caused Atiśa to be aware of clear differences between 
Avadhūtipa’s Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, giving Atiśa strong faith 
in the Madhyamaka system of Candrakīrti.47  
   Indeed, the Collection on the Two Realities,  as well as the Dbu ma’i man ngag 
gi ’bum (Apple 2013), in commenting upon Atiśa’s Madhyamakopadeśa and 
Satyadvayāvatāra, elaborate upon Candrakīrti’s system of Madhyamaka where mind, 
mental factors, and conceptuality are “cut-off” in the state of Buddhahood. The text 
advocates a faith-based Madhyamaka based on Mahāyāna sūtras rather than śāstras, 
placing emphasis on scriptural authority (āgama,lung) rather than logic (pramāṇa) (fol. 
4a2, 5b1-7). Along these lines, the Kadampa author will directly cite, or refer to, the 
Madhyamaka works of Nāgārjuna (nine times), Āryadeva, Śrīgupta (twice), 
Jñānagarbha (twice), Śāntarakṣita (three times), Bhāviveka, and Candrakīrti (twice) 
without mentioning any divisions between them. The commentary exhibits an 
understanding of Madhyamaka thinkers as not being in conflict with each other.  
Unexpectedly, the author will cite Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika as proof for the 
reasoning that things do not arise without a cause as found in the first chapter of 
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. The Kadampa author, like other Indian and 
Tibetan scholar between the 11th and 13th century, may have considered Dharmakīrti as 
a Mādhyamika (Steinkellner 1990).  
   In the translation which follows I have placed in bold print text which corresponds 
with Atiśa’s Madhyamakopadeśa. I have also formatted the text with paragraph 
divisions that correspond to the sections marked with a double shad in the manuscript 
where the content of the commentary is differentiated.  
                                                   
46 Sūtrasamuccayasañcayārtha, extended colophon not in Derge Tanjur but Bstan’ gyur gser bris ma, 
mdo ’grel a, fol. 513r:…lha khang ke ru’i khyams smad kyi ban de bdag gyi zhus te gdams ngag dang 
bcas te gnang ngo/ jo bo’i bla ma a wa dhū ti pas rab tu mi gnas pa’i lta ba dang / las mtha’ sems 
bskyed pa’i cho ga dang / mdo kun las btus pa’i don man ngag tu byas pa ’di gsum stabs gcig tu gnang 
ba lags so // Cf. Chattopadhyaya 1967:462.   
47 Rgyal ba’i ’byung gnas (2012:46.13-16): nga’i bla ma shānti pa brgyad stong pa gsung tsa na dbu 
mar bshad pa thams cad re re nas sun phyung bas / nga’i dbu ma’i lta ba de nyid gsal btab pa bzhin du 
song / rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma shin tu gsal bar gyur / nga zla ba grags pa’i lugs la shin tu dad pa 






[1a] Collection on the Two Realities  (bden gnyis kyi ’bum)  
 
[1b]  I pay homage to the omniscient one 
Who liberates from all faults and  
Who is adorned with all virtuous qualities; 
A friend of all sentient beings.  
 
   I will speak a little bit about the dharma teaching of the Lord [Atiśa] to cause faith 
in the faithful. May it consist for others in three [aspects of being] practical, an 
exposition, and equal in collections [of merit and wisdom]. It is not Tibetans who 
accuse Lord [Atiśa]. There are many who rely on Secret Mantra and it is not suitable as 
an object of explanation to study in collecting [merit and wisdom]. Even all the sayings 
of the Hymn of Practice (spyod pa’i glu) and the Vajra Hymn (rdo rje’i glu) are 
completion stage practices which rely on Secret Mantra. There may be a small 
precipice in the single purpose in all those [Secret Mantra teachings] so this dharma 
teaching is all. Although there are many systems of positing the two realities, for the 
followers of Reting [Monastery] (ra-sdreng), this dharma teaching is sufficient as it is 
comparable to all [others]. An abundance of useless talk has no purpose. Among the 
three purposes formerly stated in the Indian language, only gratitude (byas pa gzo’ ba) 
is essential, similar to writing other works. [This text] was written by Lord [Atiśa] as 
his own guru, Gser-gling-ba, wrote a letter that requested Atiśa to provide a means of 
defining the Madhyamaka system of the two realities. Since it is written and taught 
with respect, [this text] is established as a pure source. The Madhyamaka [thought] of 
Atiśa is due to the kindness of Āvadhutipa who [Atiśa] served and followed for seven 
years. Since [Atiśa] had great reverance for Gser-gling-ba, it is [due to] previous karma 
that [he] apprehended the Madhyamaka view of a sharp minded paṇḍita like him. The 
teaching that it is beneficial to cultivate a forceful elimination of the conceptual 
elaborations of cognizer and cognized is unacceptable. At the onset, [Atiśa] did not 
have great reverance for Śāntipa. Later, when [Śāntipa] heard him [i.e., Atiśa] among 
26 
 
Tibetans like a bull stating that “the proper object is that all things do not have inherent 
existence,” [Śāntipa] was not pleased. It is said that Lord [Atiśa], immediately upon 
initiating a discussion on a little bit of Madhyamaka, was thrown out due to [Śāntipa] 
being annoyed. For the benefit of quickly apprehending the language, svad tya is reality 
(bden pa), dho ya na is two, a ba ta ra na is “to enter.” In the future this will be a seed 
of the condition for quickly apprehending, having met with and encountered, the 
Sanskrit language (saṃ kri ta’i skad). The system of assigning the title is like “The 
story of the ravishment of Sītā and the killing of Mkhar ba.”48 The actual Entrance to 
the Two Realities: with regard to all the pronouncements of the Buddha being grouped 
into two realities, there is the mistaken conventional, since the activity of an object, or 
the measure of its appearance, is empty, and the correct conventional, which has causal 
efficacy as a measure of its appearance, being some thing (chos can) that is pleasing 
when unexamined, a dependent arising for affliction and purification, that arises and 
ceases. As it occurs from India as a dharma teaching for the world [2a1], it is a subject 
that is known in India. Moreover, it is written with gratitude by him. As this was 
written as a letter for the sake of students in future generations, when one has made 
conditions to encounter dharma teachings to practice, when one encounters dharma 
teachings by the conditions of dwelling in harm, one should understand with gratitude 
and kindness. [This teaching] should be understood as created for the total benefit for 
the world. When the previous spiritual teacher (bla ma), in the process of protecting 
[this teaching], was passing away, stated that “I am protecting this [teaching], with the 
loss of life or letting go the force of life, having taken to entrust this to you.” This is 
just as it was spoken at the time of the passing of Dge-bshes Ston-pa when he handed 
[the teaching] over to another spiritual teacher. If it is not handed over like this, not a 
single word of the spoken transmission of that spiritual teacher will be granted. Oneself 
should meditate, supplicate, make offerings, pay homage, rely on the spiritual teacher 
with respectful faith, establish aspirational prayers to meet [the spiritual teacher] from 
here on in future lifetimes, staying at ease in not seeking out other spiritual teachers. 
                                                   
48 This story relates to how the titles of texts should be made up. See De Jong, “An Old Tibetan 
Version of the Rāmāyaṇa” page 191. Das (1902) relates it from Atiśa’s biography. See Ulrike Roesler, 
“The Great Indian Epics in the Version of Dmar ston Chos kyi rgyal po,” in Tibet, Past, and 
Present:Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet (2002) edited by Blezer and Ardussi, pp. 447, notes 40, 
41, 43.   
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Likewise, when making prayers throughout this lifetime do not become satisfied. Later, 
from here on, when reflecting upon something like reality, having met with a superior 
one, having held previous thoughts, other oral instructions will come into being as 
meditation. In dependence on that high approach, moreover, make offerings and 
request at once–“for me, may I be able to have complete strength. And formerly, with 
respect to that, since I had disbelief I was incapable of receiving previous blessings. 
Even future blessings may also be incapable as unwholesome, negativities have 
increased.” Potaba has said, “Now, everyone is like when the owner of a young bull 
seeks out the young bull after it has gone down a path. When the bull stops, he goes 
again while being pursued having turned away from the owner. The neighbors 
recognize that [the bull] desires to go back to its own home again. When straying from 
the path, [the bull] is killed having been carried away by a robber. We will be similar to 
the bull so we must try to reside straight up not straying from the path. [The bull] did 
not listen at all, and having strayed from the path, was killed by a robber. When the 
chick of a grouse does not completely die, the other chicks will protect the grouse when 
dwelling in the same nest. Its wings are not fully formed and it jumps from the nest in 
an untimely manner. When limping around a hawk and weasel will eat [the chick]. We 
are also like this as we sit up in the nest. When we have an untimely fall, the hawk and 
weasel will carry us away. Not listening, everyone will be carried away by the hawk 
and weasel. [2b1] So like that, everyone who dwells will likewise be slaughtered by the 
robber, carried away by the hawk and weasel.” All three brothers and Geshe Ston-pa 
having passed away, the paṇḍita himself went, and having listened to the last testament 
of Geshe Ston-pa, all those did not stretch the heart of expectation to exist longer than 
before we achieved the purpose. In general, this action is of special great importance 
for a trustworthy source for dharma to be established as a pure source similar to what 
was previously stated. The benefit to learn the language quickly, at that time the king 
and all his ministers arranged Indian texts according to a rule since scholars and 
translators would have many benefits even by understanding merely this much through 
the aim of knowing the translation. That which is taught as ma-dha-ma, that which is 
said as mahā-ma-ka has the meaning of “the middle”; +u-pa dhe-sha is called special 
instruction; na-ma has the meaning of “what is called.” In the future, a translator will 
be incapable of pure knowledge through relying on merely this, yet even now, it is 
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repeated as a cause to produce familiarity when meeting with the Sanskrit language in 
the future through creating predispositions. The meaning of the title: regarding this, 
outsiders accept a Self or a person to exist and since they assert cause and effect, truth, 
and the [three] jewels to not exist, they fall into the extremes of either superimposition 
or deprecation. Two of our own schools and the Yogācāra, since they assert both a 
subject and object, the other-powered nature (paratantra), and mere representation as 
substantially established, they are said to fall to the extreme of superimposition. In this 
regard, when one upholds the two realities by being free from the two extremes it is the 
Middle.  Through being easy to understand it is Special Instructions because, through 
a little bit of the basic text and words, one is able to understand the meaning of the two 
realities through hearing and contemplation and directly realize through meditation. 
Furthermore, the Ācārya [Nāgārjuna] has taught,  
 
“To those who seek reality, at first, one should state ‘Everythings exists.’ 
When they have understood things and become detached, then later declare 
things as isolated (viviktatā).”49 
  
Āryadeva has stated,  
 
“At first overturn non-virtue; midway one should overturn [the notion of] self;  
in the end one should overturn everything. One who understands in this way is 
Wise.”50   
 
   Since all these sayings are special instructions, first, for this life, and for after that 
also, by accumulating actions for this [life], later one comes to understand that the 
experiencing of happiness and suffering exists, and one has faith which has confidence 
                                                   
49 Yuktiṣaṣṭika, verse 30: de nyid tshol la thog mar ni / / thams cad yod ces brjod par bya / / don rnams 
rtogs shing chags med nas de yi ’og tu dben pa’o / / Loizzo 2007:180 (Eng), 318 (Tib). Sanskrit: 
sarvam astīti vaktavyam ādau tattvagaveṣiṇah ̣ | paścād avagatārthasya niḥsaṅgasya viviktatā 
(Lindtner 1982: 110) 
50 dang por bsod nams min las bzlog / bar du bdag las bzlog bya zhing / tha mar kun las bzog bya ba / 
/ de ltar shes pa rigs par ldan / Canonical Tibetan: bsod nams min pa dang por bzlog / bar du bdag ni 
bzlog pa dang / phyi nas lta zhig kun bzlog pa / gang gis shes de mkhas pa yin / Catuḥśataka, ch.8, 




in impermanence and karmic causes and effects. Since a similar point has been 
established from the Ratnāvāli, it is essential that one does not [3a1] deprecate 
conventional reality, and that one overturns non-virtue. Then, through offering up an 
awareness that accumulates virtue and through relying on the special instructions of the 
guru, one will understand the conditions of the successive relations of previous karma 
and its results, one will understand that even the rebirths among the five lineages of 
transmigration do not have even a mere moment of happiness apart from suffering. 
Through realizing the faults of all of conditioned existence, one will have disgust and 
detachment. The cause that establishes existence with its faults is both karma and 
mental afflictions. The root of karma and the root of afflictions is the view for a Self. 
The view for a Self is not held when merely establishing some self but holding a Self is 
through mistaking it for the collection of the aggregates and so forth. Since the 
aggregates and so forth are incompatible with the characteristics of a Self, up until one 
understands the nature of selflessness one should overcome the Self and eliminate 
superimposing the nature of a Self.  
   Then, at the time of wandering in infinite cylic existence consisting of a successive 
continuum of cause and effect, as it is the case that all sentient beings are one’s mother, 
all sentient beings who are construed as one’s mother, who are deluded with respect to 
the two realities, who suffer as a Self in existence by the force of delusion, one relies 
upon great compasssion in desiring to establish all sentient beings in complete 
buddhahood, the everlasting liberation from the suffering of cyclic existence. For the 
purpose of the wish to set sentient beings in that [state], oneself realizes the goals of the 
aspiration for awakening, compassion, love that wishes to attain that [state] and being 
detached from one’s own liberation. Since it is necessary to engage in the causes for 
achieving the result of complete buddhahood, realize all the uncommon points of the 
cause, the six perfections, and without attachment to them, make firm the factors of 
method inclusive of concentration. Then, one will be unable to abandon the view of a 
Self if one has not abandoned apprehending dharmas as substantially existent (chos kyi 
dngos por ’dzin pa). Even if one is able to eliminate the view of a Self, if one does not 
meditate on all dharmas as unproduced, because of not eliminating the obscurations for 
objects of knowledge, therefore not attaining total omniscience, one must eliminate the 
extreme of superimposition which is devoid of essence of dharmas and reverse any 
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apprehension [of things] as real through relying on ultimate reality. In this way, 
ascertaining the characteristics of the two realities through listening and contemplation 
is called “view.” At the time of meditating on reality, having sat in a cross-legged 
posture on a comfortable seat and [3b1] while practicing, ascertain the unproduced by 
means of examining with reasoning, determining all entities, and cutting off duality. 
One should understand that even the knowledge through the force of unestablished 
objects of knowledge itself becomes pacified. At the time of actual practice, having 
cleared away the faults of laxity and excitement, one should be established in the 
non-conceptual nature for as long as the enemies or robbers of signs and conceptuality 
do not arise. At the time after [meditation], bearing in mind that all dharmas are like an 
illusion, one should make effort in the collection of merit by means of pure activity of 
the three spheres [of agent, action, and object]. In this way, from practicing with 
devotion, for a long time, and uninterruptedly, at the time of seeing reality, in both 
meditation and after [meditation], one directly realizes the aims of the two realities. 
These very aims are to become gradually accustomed to, and traverse, the ten 
[bodhisattva] stages, and through the vajra-like concentration one will abandon without 
exception the most subtle latencies of apprehending things as real and from that point 
on one will make manifest the highest limit of reality (yang dag pa’i mtha’). Abiding in 
this very condition of meditative equipoise at all times, the awakened activities (’phrin 
las) which achieves the aims of sentient beings by the impelling force of previous 
accumulations and aspirational prayers gradually takes rebirth as a continuum of a 
person that uninterruptedly occurs exactly according to the good fortune of those to be 
trained.  Having imputed this as the actual special instructions of the middle way, 
words like this are also set in letters in a book and are the general meaning of terms 
which appear to the mind. The translator’s homage is naturally pure when 
contemplating lord Avalokiteśvara. Since all buddhas are lords of the world, when 
contemplating in this way it is in harmony with the śāstra and since the Sūtra on the 
Meeting of Father and Son states “The Tathāgata has realized both the conventional 
and the ultimate. The objects to be known are exhausted here in the two realities,” it is 
only omniscience which understands the two realities exactly as they are. Generally, it 
is an appropriate aim (skab su bab pa’i don) to pay homage to only Mañjuśrī in 
Madhyamaka treatises. The Ācārya Nāgārjuna, having declared an homage to 
31 
 
omniscience in both the Root of the Middle Way and the Precious Garland, dwell in the 
middle. The Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning and so forth all pay homage to the feet of 
Gautama. The purpose of paying homage is so that obstacles will not occur and that the 
composition will be completed. The composition of the translator will be completed 
having established a translation in Tibetan letters; up to present times this is for making 
an oral explanation of the teaching. 
   [4a1] It is said that a person from Lhasa views a person from Reting 
(rwa-dreng-ba) in the desire for a deity and that the view is only desire for a deity. 
Likewise, those who are on the Mahāyāna path, since it is to undertaken in order to 
realize the two realities, undertake and supplicate through paying homage, worshipping, 
and offering to actualize omniscience with the mind and to cut through all karmic 
obscurations that impede realizing the two realities. Other than realizing the two 
realities through the blessings of [these activities] when supplicating, one is not able to 
discern the meaning of the two realities through logic.   
   The homage statement of the treatise itself, the statements related from “One who” 
through to “supreme holy person” since he has become the chief or supreme of all,  
he is the supreme of two-legged beings, the omniscient one, who himself has stated “I 
am the supreme in this world.” Since his light rays of speech are likened to a rising 
sun, the Lord himself is mentioned through stating “like me and so forth” through 
clearing away the darkness of delusion in its entirety without prejudice in the 
distinctions of sentient beings, the multitude gathered in the midst. According to a 
scholar who has an extensive commentary on entering to the Abhidharma, “heart” is 
explained as mental consciousness (yid kyi rnam shes). It is a meaning which abides in 
the heart or in the center and the darkness which deludes objects of knowledge, the two 
realities, is produced within the sphere of that [mental consciousness] and since the 
wisdom which opens the mind to objects of knowledge, the two realities, is produced 
within the sphere of that, it is only reasoning. He states “I bow down to the supreme 
holy person” who extensively makes joy in opening his mouth to one closed to the two 
realities at the lotus of the mental consciousness of the heart. Generally, when praising 
a complete, perfect buddha one praises the three qualities of cause, effect, and 
awakened activity, but here, by stating “supreme holy person” both the final end of 
abandonment and wisdom, the result, and the awakened activity of speech are praised.  
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[4a7] How is the lotus of the heart opened up through clearing away the darkness of 
delusion? Prior to the Buddha arriving in the world, all the world was darkened by the 
darkness of delusion. He taught dharma when he arrived [in this world] to the fortunate 
ones who dwelled in the central land [of India], the cause and effect consisting of 
affliction and purification or the meaning of the two realities, which opens up the lotus 
of the heart and clears away the darkness of delusion. Then, gradually, commonly, 
including all of Tibet, [4b1] for the humans who had acccumulated merit, immediately 
the Buddha Sarvārthasiddhi “He who achieves all aims” spoke two verses and so forth. 
After forty-nine days from awakening, in Ba-ra-na-se [=Varanasi] he turned the wheel 
of dharma of the four truths, and by teaching at first their characteristics, the Noble 
Kun-shes go’u-di [=Ārya ājñātakauṇḍinya] saw the dharma. Three times [the Buddha] 
stated “Do you perfectly understand the dharma?” and in replying that “I understand” 
gave him the name of “all-knowing” (kun-shes = ājñāta). Having turned two answers 
to “suffering should be understood” arhatship was realized by the five other ones who 
saw the dharma. Having turned three answers stating “I realize suffering is to be 
known and now that which is to be known does not exist” the six became arhats, the 
five [disciples] were five [arhats] and the sixth was the Buddha.” Then the teachings 
taught gradually may be grouped into the twelve limbs and the two or three piṭakas. 
The teacher in his final words at the time of the final nirvāṇa gave the pratimokṣa, the 
teaching of the four applications of mindfulness gathered in the three basket collections 
as the group of six monks themselves had trained. “I truly reside in having done what is 
to be done, my relics are mere grains and I have given the twelve limbs without 
disinction.” The Buddha having passed, the saṃgha requested to the noble Ānanda  
“Where was it that the Blessed One expounded the Turning the Wheel of the Dharma 
Sūtra? Child of the Sugata, speak! One of great wisdom, speak!” in this way the 
teaching and collections exist through a continuous lineage up to the present day. In 
regards to clearing away the darkness of delusion and opening the lotus of the 
heart, uncommonly [the Buddha] dwells opening up the lotus of the heart and clearing 
awaying delusion through teaching innumerable teachings while dwelling in Tuṣita 
heaven or in the womb of the Mother. Delusion includes all misknowledge, mistaken 
consciousness, and doubt. From among these, the greatest mistaken consciousness is 
solely to view other lifetimes as non-existent. The protector of all beings, the 
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characteristics of the three jewels will become mistaken. Even when other lifetimes 
exist, [they are thought to] occur without a cause or are caused by a creator like Iśvara 
and so forth. One then accepts the occurrence from a discordant cause. Permanence, 
happiness, and purity [5a1] are mistaken as a Self, one upholds sentient beings as 
adversaries, and one has attachment to all dharmas as substantially existent entities and 
so forth. In order to clear these away, the Buddha teaches preliminary dharma 
teachings, at first, all beings die, and except for the three [types] of Arhats, all will take 
rebirth. He teaches The Sūtra on Impermanence and so forth to clear away initial 
delusion. In this way, one produces an awareness which seeks out a place of refuge due 
to fear and terror based on a definite understanding of the endless cycle of birth and 
death. At that time, it is only the speech of the Buddha that opens up the lotus of the 
heart having cleared away delusion on the greatness of the [three] jewels as a place of 
refuge. By that [speech], one is protected by principle blessings from the hostilities of 
this life and in this manner one is protected principally by scriptural teachings from the 
lower realms of rebirth up through the inferior vehicle in opening up the lotus of the 
heart and clearing away the darkness of delusion. The magnificient Buddha 
qualities of the Buddha himself and the bodhisattvas who dwell on the tenth stage teach 
later like this but an ācārya never knows all according to Ge-shes Ston-pa. 
   [5a4] Then, through the force of being protected by the teaching transmission from 
the three lower realms of rebirth, in all rebirths one experiences happiness and 
suffering and takes rebirth just in accordance with one’s accumulated karma. Even 
though one takes rebirth in happy realms of rebirth through having performed 
contaminated virtuous deeds, all that has a deceptive quality which is impermanent, 
even its intrinsic nature is nothing other than a mistaken happiness for suffering. 
Therefore, is it necessary to meditatively cultivate an uncontaminated path that wishes 
to attain transcendance from the suffering of existence. One understands that by 
meditatively cultivating an uncontaminated path one achieves everlasting liberation 
from cyclic existence, although one does not attain Buddhahood but merely one’s own 
liberation. It is nothing but shameless when achieving merely one’s own liberation 
having abandoned sentient beings, who are considered as one’s kinsmen, who suffer in 
cyclic existence. All sentient beings at the time of being intoxicated are punished by the 
stream of birth and death in limitless cyclic existence are my mother. Through making 
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firm great compassion for all sentient beings considered as [one’s] mother who 
experience various sufferings in cyclic existence I produce the mind which aspires 
[and] solemnly promises great awakening for the sake of sentient beings. As one 
understands the necessity of engaging in the cause based on a wish to attain the result, 
one ascertains and practices the defining features of the cause, the five perfections. 
Having relied on conventional reality [5b], one clears away the darkness of delusion 
and opens the lotus of the heart, abandoning the extreme of deprecation. In this way, 
even by being accustomed to the factors of method which rely upon conventional 
reality, if one does not realize ultimate reality whose meaning is the unproduced, 
complete omniscience will not be attained and all obstructions without exception will 
not be abandoned. The Noble Perfection of Wisdom Sutra and the Sutra which Teaches 
All Things Do Not Arise and so forth settle the meaning of the unproduced, and through 
clearing away the darkness of delusion and opening the lotus of the heart for 
ultimate reality one abandons the extreme of superimposition, comprehending exactly 
as they are the meaning of the two realities. Since it is only complete omniscience, the 
only point of relevance is to bow down to that [omniscience]. An ācārya who perceives 
the truth of reality construes as authoritative only that [omniscience] itself. It is said 
that the special instruction of paying homage to complete omniscience was made at the 
time of translating the Vinaya. The collected bits of scriptural authority in the 
Vinayasutra provide many contradictory answers through examining contradiction and 
non-contradition based on only oral scriptural authority. However many answers to 
objections occur throughout the Abhidharmakośaṭika and the Commentary to the Great 
Dependent-Arising that are settled by only scriptural oral authority (āgama, lung). 
Bhāviveka, even when ascertaining the meaning of the profound, does not settle it by 
merely withered logic but reaches a conclusion only through scriptural oral authority. 
Geshes Ston-pa has stated that the meaning of the unproduced is taught later in a 
similar way by buddhas and bodhisattvas who reside on the tenth stage but that ācāryas 
do not know this. In his last words at the time of his passing, at the time of the passing 
of the guru [Geshes Ston-pa], the other disciples searched [for a teacher] and he said, 
“Since a spiritual friend to be entrusted to you alone does not appear in Tibet, for your 
mutual support take the sūtrapiṭaka as your spiritual friend.”51 Thus, in special 
                                                   
51 See Vetturini 2007: 108 for later historical accounts of this saying.  
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instructions that do not rely on the Buddha’s scriptural authority, any intelligent one 
would not be confident nor go along the path. [Scriptural statements say] “The view is 
indicated by seeing” and  “see the Buddha,” which is to produce a view which realizes 
the abiding nature from his scriptural oral tradition but is not realized by logic. 
   [5b8] The practical purpose is, as previously mentioned, to cut off hindrances, and 
moreover, to produce a genuine intellectual understanding that increases in all future 
rebirths. As previously mentioned, arising from the blessings of the Buddha study, 
contemplate, and meditate at all times. [6a] As when the Lord [Atiśa] argued with 
[non-Buddhist] outsiders, the force of faith is without a biased mind. The obstacles of a 
small man are produced by one’s bad intelligence. This is overturned when paying 
homage, worshipping, and supplicating omniscience. Through relying on conventional 
reality, one is said to abandon the extreme of deprecation and is said to enter the 
middle way. The actual middle way special instructions, the middle way special 
instructions of the great vehicle is said to be this and so forth. Generally, even the 
schools from among the four great buddhist traditions, along with those who are as 
outsiders, superimpose since a Self and so forth does not exist. Those of the Great 
Vehicle state that my assertion that the Self of a person does not even conventionally 
exist is falling to the extreme of deprecation. They rely on the mere dharma of subject 
and object, the experience of happiness or suffering arising from the carrying out of 
virtuous or non-virtuous actions. They attain liberation from cultivating the 
uncontaminated path and all cause and effect of affliction and purification is all that 
exists and that is said to be the middle way free from the two extremes. The Yogācāra 
state that the outsider [non-Buddhists] accept the Self and that the Sautrāntika assertion 
that the material elements and that which arises from the material elements are the 
apprehended object and the six groups of consciousness which apprehends them are 
substantially existent is a superimposition. The Madhyamakas who assert that the 
dependent-nature of mere cognition only does not exist at all is a deprecation. That is 
according to the way the Madhyānta[vibhāga]52 states “because [false imagining] 
                                                   
52 Cf. Nagao 1964:17-18: abhūtaparikalpo 'sti dvayan tatra na vidyate / śūnyatā vidyate tv atra 
tasyām api sa vidyate // na śūnyaṃ nāpi cāśūnyaṃ tasmāt sarvam vidhīyate / sattvād asattvāt sattvāc 
ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā // Translation based on Mathes 2000:197-197: “false imagining exists.  
Duality is not found in that. But emptiness is found there, [and false imagining] is found in relation to 
[emptiness] as well. Therefore, everything is taugth as neither empty nor non-empty, because [false 
imagining] exists, because [duality] does not exist, and because [false imagining] exists [in relation to 
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exists, because [duality] does not exist, and because [false imagining] exists [in relation 
to emptiness, and emptiness in relation to false imagining]. And this is the middle 
path.” The dependent-nature exists as mere cognitive representation, and since the 
apprehended object and apprehending subject, the imagined nature, does not exist, the 
perfect nature, reality which is empty of the imagined nature in the dependent-nature 
does exist. They say only this is called the middle. In this particular sense the middle 
way special instructions of the great vehicle is mentioned. [6a7] Conventionally all 
dharmas existent just in the manner they are presented and through the principle that 
states53 “that which is the real nature of the conventional is considered the same as the 
ultimate,” ultimately the conventional itself when examined by reason, something the 
size of the tip of a hair that is split a hundred times does not exist. In this way, by 
the expression two realities, since it is free from the two extremes of deprecation and 
superimposition by extension it is called middle way and special instructions is like as 
before. Through this, the introduction (gleng bslang ba, *upodghāta) of the treatise is 
indicated and the “purpose-connection” (dgos ’brel) is taught in four parts. [6b] The 
subject matter (brjod bya, abhideya) of this is the two realities. The purpose (dgos pa, 
prayojana) is to realize the [two realities] by [the wisdoms arising from] hearing and 
contempation. The purpose of the purpose (dgos pa’i dgos pa, prayojanaprayojana) is 
to integrate means and wisdom through relying on the two realities. In the time period 
after seeing reality, those on the tenth [stage] directly realize the two realities. At the 
time of final buddhahood one abides in the nature of only meditative equipoise and will 
uninterruptedly appear just as the good fortune of beings for the aims of others. The 
relation (’brel pa, sambandha) is the relation between the purpose and the treatise. The 
relation between the purpose of the purpose and the purpose is in the manner of the 
means (thabs, upaya) and that which arises from the means (thabs las byung ba, 
upeya).54 [6b3] At first, when settling the characteristics of the two realities by hearing 
                                                                                                                                       
emptiness, and emptiness in relation to false imagining]. And this is the middle path.”  
53 Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā, 17a (Eckel 1987:87, Tibetan, p.173): kun rdzob de bzhin 
nyid gang yin // de nyid dam pa’i don gyis bzhed // Sanskrit in Haribhadra’s AAA: saṃvrtes tathatā 
yaiva paramārthasya sā matā / abhedāt so ’pi ni nyāyo yathādarśanam āstshitaḥ 
54 This echoes the relationship between the two realities found in Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra and 
Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (6.80). The Satyadvayāvatāra, vs. 19 (Ejima 1983:365-366; Apple 
2013:314): [The Ācārya Candrakīrti has stated as follows: “Conventional reality fuctions as a means, 
and ultimate reality functions as the goal. Those who do not understand the difference between the 
two have a bad understanding and get a bad rebirth.” slob dpon zla grags ’di skad du {om. Ejima} // 
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and thinking, “conventionally” and so forth  the four truths are certainly grouped 
within the two realities but in this regard the great amount of the expressible existents 
have been sorted into five. The two words the sūtras use for the two realities are not 
grouped or are not incomplete. Regarding this, “kun” has the meaning of all or the 
limits and “rdzob” is in the Zhang-zhung language. Since it has the meaning of false, 
the limits or all is false or obscured is the meaning of “kun rdzob” (“all-obscured”, i.e. 
the conventional). All dharmas includes the aggregates, elements, and sensory media, 
or all that is afflicted and that which is to be purified. All that is construed from the 
perspective of the ordinary individual, one with narrow vision, one who habitually 
clings to things as substantially existent. One states, “indicate the nature having 
established in mind the worldly relation of cause and effects of actions.” [6b5] 
Generally, the conventional is not at all existent other than cause and effect. “True 
just as it is established” is true as measured and apprehended as real by those of 
narrow vision but that nature is a false object as mentioned before: 
 
“Whatever near and other, that appearance does not exist and is like a 
reflection. The essence of just how it is is artificial.” 
 
   Through this manner, it is a mere appearance through dependence on similar cause 
and condition. For example, like a reflection which appears through dependence on 
mere similarity with that in a mirror. Here, Spyan-nga55 and Rnal-’byor-pa Chen-po56 
say that is it like the legend of foolish talk in the language of pigeons. The very 
appearance for one of narrow vision is an incompatible inferior appearance and  
“stating all is true for all that is false” in the section of the Śikṣasamuccaya which 
                                                                                                                                       
thabs su gyur pa kun rdzob bden pa dang / / thabs las byung ba don dam bden pa dag / gnyis po’i dbye 
ba gang gis mi shes pa / /de dag log par rtogs pas ngan ’gror ’gro // 19 //. Madhyamakāvatāra, 6.80 
(La Vallée Poussin [1907-11], p.175.3-6): tha snyad bden pa thabs su gyur pa dang / / don dam bden 
pa thabs byung gyur pa ste / / de gnyis rnam dbye gang gis mi shes pa / / de ni rnam rtog log pas lam 
ngan zhugs / /6.80 / /. Cited in the Subhāṣitasaṃgraha (Bendall 1905:22.7-10): upāyabhūtaṃ 
vyavahārasatyam upeyabhūtaṃ paramārthasatyam / tayor vibhāgaṃ na paraiti yo vai mithyāvikalpaiḥ 
sa kumārgayātaḥ // As noted by Lindtner (1979:89n13), this verse is also cited in the 
Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakaṭīkā, chapter III (Peking bstan ’gyur, vol.98, dbu ma Ya 63a.1-2). 
55 Spyan-snga tshul-khrims-’bar (1038-1103) was the youngest of the three Kadampa brothers, the 
other two being Po-to-ba rin chen (1027-1105) and Phu-chung-ba gzhon-nu rgyal-mtshan, 
1031-1106). 
56 Rnal-’byor-pa Chen-po Byang-chub-rin-chen (1015–1078) was a direct disciple of Atiśa and later 
became abbot of Reting monastery after ’Brom-ston rgyal-ba’i ’byung-gnas. 
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investigates the water element, the water itself appears up to twenty aeons as spoken in 
the [Abhidharma-]Kośa is not spoken according to the world. [7a1] Whenever the 
conventional is asserted as the mind, it is the appearance of the ordinary mind. When 
construed through the force of existent external objects, all incompatible appearances, 
as a measure of appearance, are true, but since that which is established as substantial 
does not exist, is it called “false.” It is false since it is not established substantially and 
in the section of the activity of the Mother [Perfection of Wisdom] it states that 
everything, all dharmas from form up through omniscience, are indicated by 
conventional transactions. For as long as one does not abandon clinging to things as 
real, and the mountain-like [notion] of “I,” the occurrence of causes and effects, the 
accumulation of causes and conditions, are undeceiving and undeniably occurs as they 
are not distinct [7a3] from being established as substantially existent and as real in the 
purview of one with narrow vision. It is called “conventional reality” and by the force 
of delusion for both cause and effect and the meaning of suchness, the delusion for the 
cause and effect and karma and its effects which produce the three lower realms of 
rebirth from sinful unvirtuous actions does not exist for the object of suchness. By the 
force of delusion, through contaminated virtue the cause and effect of birth among 
gods and humans and freedom from the delusion of both those by understanding all 
existence as suffering, one generates detachment. For the purpose of abandoning the 
cause of that [suffering] by training in the two trainings, one attains one’s own 
liberation through the cause and effect of the inferior vehicle (theg dman, hīnayāna). 
Through the training of a bodhisattva who is impelled by the aspiration for awakening 
(bodhicitta), who produces [the aspiration] spontaneously and continually for the 
purpose of all sentient beings that pervade the limits of space, is the cause and effect of 
the great vehicle (theg chen, mahāyāna). The six or eight groups of consciousness of 
ordinary individuals and the wisdom of Noble beings are all from the cause and effect 
of birth from four conditions [perceived] as real along with their appearances. The 
appearances to sentient beings in hell of the four levels of red-hot irons and so forth; 
the appearances of skeletons, pus, and blood and so forth for hungry ghosts; the 
appearances to animals, those who abide in and are scattered throughout the outer 
oceans and continents; the appearances to humans among the four continents; the 
appearance of the six types of desire realms gods; the appearanaces that appear at 
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certain times of the mansions of the Brahmā-realm gods of the first concentration up 
through the individual mansions of the gods of the fourth concentration; and even all 
the appearances of the pure fields, the extremely pure fields of the Buddhas, are in the 
perspective of one with narrow vision (tshu rol thong ba, arvāgdarśana). Therefore, 
since it is true [from this perspective], the Buddha did not contradict teaching the world. 
[However,] it is said that the correct teaching is nothing [7b] whatsoever. Therefore, 
those who let go by dividing the ultimate as emptiness, and then, throughout existence 
conventionally apprehend [things] as real, [understand] that by taking life a sentient 
being is reborn as hell-beings, hungry ghosts, or as animals; that when one is reborn as 
a human, one issues forth the maturations of harmonious life and sickness and so forth; 
that when one abandons the taking of life, one is reborn as a god or human among the 
happy realms. Moreover, through issuing forth the maturation of long-life and little 
sickness, one places trust in all that is said about abandoning non-virtue and 
persevering in virtue having relied on conventional reality. The great vital point is that 
one is free from the extreme of deprecation. The spiritual teacher of Lord [Atiśa], 
Avadhūtipa, bestowed to Lord [Atiśa] the special instruction of non-arising. It is 
according to the nature [of this teaching] that, as long as one has not exhausted the 
view for a Self, it is not suitable to belittle or waste even the most subtle action. The 
yogin who has attained the great power of concentration, the scholar paṇḍita who is a 
great master, the elders (sthavira) of the saṃgha—one should not belittle them thinking, 
this one has merely attained concentration, this is merely a scholar, and these are 
merely elders. Great supersensory powers see much in understanding that this fault and 
this belittling leads to rebirth now as a hell-being in this place, a hungry ghost in that 
place and so forth. Geshe Ston-pa said, “O followers of the Elder [Atiśa], great 
pretension is inappropriate.” 57  Entities are emptiness. One should imagine in 
meditation that one’s hands are placed in a fire with nothing to help one. Since it is 
both the burned and the burner, the hand scorched by fire is said to be reality. 
Generally, by attaining confidence, when one belittles, that is deceptive. This occurs 
without independence by the force of the afflictions. Relying on regret when engaging 
in practice, it is possible to not produce a result. [7b6] Therefore, for as long as one 
                                                   
57 Quoted in Tsong-kha-pa’s Lam rim chen mo, p. 195, for English see Cutler and Newland, 2000, 
volume 1, p.251.  
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does not exhaust the view for a Self, from a cattle herdsmen up to one training in the 
the five knowledges, all appears as agreeable. It is real as merely that. All your rebirths 
are understood as like an illusionary person by this principle. One on the first 
[bodhisattva] level that follows after seeing reality, by cognizing the fundamental 
nature of the conventional—the rebirths of the three lower relams, the rebirths of the 
two happy realms, attaining the liberation of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha by training 
in the three trainings, obtaining Buddhahood which performs actions for the purpose of 
all sentient beings who pervade the extent of the sky, the training of a bodhisattva 
which is impelled by the aspiration for awakening, the consciousness and wisdom 
which arises from the four conditions, and all the former appearances of 
these—although the appearances exist, they are not fixated upon as truly existent and 
are understood to be like an illusion. Since they are understood as being like an illusion 
from attaining the first ground onward, it is proper to send out a hundred emanations 
instantaneously. It is never at all suitable if substantially established. There are 
different tenets for whether appearances exist or do not exist for one in reality or on the 
Buddha level. If they exist, there is not any invalidation from mere evanescent 
appearances. In this way, through the vajra-like concentration post-meditative 
appearances are not accepted and there is only meditative stabilization on reality from 
this point onward that abandons without exception the subtle latencies of grasping 
things as real. Therefore, while the fundamental nature of the aggregates and so forth is 
like an illusion, the childish apprehend them as real having relied upon a delusive basis, 
from which occurs the view for a Self and being bound in saṃsāra by the 
misknowledge which is deluded in regards to reality. The fundamental reality of the 
conventional is like an illusion, and one should study, reflect, and repeatedly 
contemplate like gSang-phu-ba who repeatedly diminished the grasping of things as 
real. From producing the path of seeing onward, since one realizes the fundamental 
nature is like an illusion, it is just like being taken by the hand. The highest of objects 
and the undeceiving object or since it is the object of holy wisdom it is the ultimate 
(don dam) or the real (yang dag pa) and when construing the unfabricated way things 
are, through the principle that “when the conventional that appears is analytically 
examined just as it, nothing whatsoever is found. The unfindable is itself the ultimate”58 
                                                   
58 Satyadvayāvatāra, vs. 21abc: / kun rdzob ji ltar snang ba ’di / / rigs pas brtags na ’ga’ mi rnyed / / 
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the text says “when the conventional as it appears” and the very nature of this is 
non-arising. By examining with the great reasonings, that which is the nature is 
realized. If the conventional is substantially established, it is not of benefit since the 
ultimate is unproduced. Relying on a conventional reality that is substantially 
established is the source of all faults.  
   [8a7] For this, the reasonings when construed at the base all production and 
cessation is called dependent-arising (rten ’brel gyi gtan tshigs, pratītyasamutpādahetu), 
one and the many (i.e. gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs, ekānekaviyogahetu) is the second. 
By dividing into three production and cessation there is four: the reasoning of 
dependent-arising, the vajra-slivers (rdo rje gzegs ma’i gtan tshigs, vajrakaṇahetu), and 
the reasoning of the production and cessation of the four limits (mu bzhi skye ’gog gi 
gtan tshigs, catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣeddhahetu).59 For this, generally, the production and 
cessation of the existence or non-existence of the result and the cause, when examined 
by the three times, is not suitable to produce a result is called dependent-arising. The 
Ācārya [Nāgārjuna] teaches that since cause and effect are only through mutual 
dependence, [8b1] there will be a result only in depedence upon a previous cause and 
just as it is dependent on a former cause, the cause and effect is fabricated, does not 
have an independent nature, and this is regarded as the reasoning of dependent-arising.  
   [8b1] For this, to refute the arising of the existent and nonexistent, Nāgārjuna states 
in his Śūnyatāsaptati:  
 
“The existent cannot be produced, since it is [already] existent; the 
non-existent cannot be produced since it is non-existent.”60 
 
   Since they are incapatible dharmas, there is not both. Because birth does not exist, 
permanence and cessation do not exist. The Sāṃkhyas assertion is clarified by the 
condition single existent result from the beginning, and our own school, the Vaibhāṣika, 
when on the ground of a future result is presently pulled along by the condition of a 
                                                                                                                                       
ma rnyed pa nyid don dam yin / See Apple 2013: 315-317.  
59 The Kadampa author is following Atiśa’s tradition of “four great reasons” (gtan tshigs chen po 
bzhi) as articulated in the Bodhipathapradīpa (Sherburne 2000: 15, 229-235). Atiśa’s system of 
positing four reasons for proving emptiness is different than Kamalaśīla who discusses five reasons 
(See Keira 2004:10-13).  
60 Śūnyatāsaptati (vs. 4ab): yod pa yod phyir skye ma yin / med pa med pa’i phyir ma yin / 
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single exist cause; this present existence, accepted as going on the ground of the past, 
the three times are substantially established and both are accepted as an existent that is 
produced. The majority of others assert production as non-existent. The Catuḥśataka 
unanimously condemns this.  Further, not including most of the sūtras, [some] accept 
the existent as produced. For all this, the Śūnyatāsaptati (vs. 4) states:  
 
“The existent cannot be produced, since it is [already] existent; the 
non-existent cannot be produced since it is non-existent since they are 
incompatible dharmas, there is not both.” 
 
The Madhyamakāvatāra states that it is not acceptable by reasoning that   
 
“Pillars and so forth as ornaments of houses are meaningless to those who 
assert a result as existent and to those who assert a result as nonexistent.”61 
 
   Through being established as existent it is unnecessary to produce. Since there does 
not exist a time of non-produced when it is produced as a nature which is already 
established, there would be the endless production. When supported by a cause that is 
existent, since a non-existent production would not occur there would be pointless 
production. Through the reasoning which states “even by a one hundred million causes 
a non-existent will not be subject to change”62 in this way a cause even with great 
power is not able to produce a non-existent. It will be a production of a rabbit’s horn 
when produced from a cause which is non-existent. Since existence and nonexistence 
are contradictory dharmas that are not possible, it is not acceptable to produce as being 
both [existent and non-existent]. For this, how is it acceptable to produce as being both 
if there is a non-existent result for a cause that is existent? When examining whether 
something exists through production or exists as not produced, the existent as a cause 
                                                   
61 This citation is actually from Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka (11.15) rather than from verses of the 
Madhyamakāvatāra:’bras bu yod par gang ’dod dang / /’bras bu med par gang ’dod la / /khyim gyi 
don du ka ba sogs / /brgyan pa’i don yang med par ’gyur/ Skt. stambhādīnām alaṃkāro gṛhasārthe 
nirarthakaḥ / satkāryam eva yasyeṣṭaṃ yasyāsatkāryam eva ca / Howevever, the verse is found in 
Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (La Vallée Poussin 1907-12: 99.13-14), cited without source, 
indicating that early Tibetans may have attributed the verse to Candrakīrti.   
62 Bodhicaryāvatāra 9.147: nābhāvasya vikāro ’sti hetukoṭiśatairapi / 
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itself is not established, and since a cause is posited having relied on a result, it is not 
acceptable for existence as a cause itself of a non-existent result and since there is a 
consequence for the faults of both, both are not possible. When examining from the 
point view of the cause, Nāgārjuna states,  
 
“No thing anywhere is ever born from itself, from something else, 
 from both or without a cause.”63  
 
   Arising is not acceptable from itself, from other, from both [itself and other], or 
without a cause. First, arising is not necessary if established from itself because when 
arising is established, it would be endless and because when independent entities like 
seeds [9a] and so forth themselves are [already] produced, consciousness, sprouts and 
so forth would be without a cause. When [that] itself is not established, it will not 
obtain even its own conventional [status] as it would be unsuitable as a cause because 
of similiarity with what is produced.  Through the reasoning that  
 
“It is not even from other, the other is other in dependence upon the other.  
Without the other, the other would not be other”64  
 
since the result is not itself established it is not established as an otherness which is 
related to that. This is because when an other is produced from an other then 
everything would be produced from everything. It does not exist from either a 
permanent or impermanent other. A permanent [other] is not acceptable as a result 
would be produced gradually and instanteously. It would be impermanent if produced 
gradually, and if instaneously, all results would be perceived at one time. One is not 
                                                   
63 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1 (Derge bsTan ’gyur, tsa 1a3 - 2b1): bdag las ma yin gzhan las min / / 
gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min / /dngos po gang dag gang na yang / /skye ba nam yang yod ma yin / 
LVP 1904: 12.13): na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ 
kva cana ke cana / / 1 / / 
64 This verse is an old Tibetan translation of MMK 14.5 which reads: /gzhan las kyang ma yin te / 
gzhan ni gzhan la bsten te gzhan / /gzhan min gzhan du mi ltar ’gyur / This version differs from the 
canonical Tibetan translation which reads /gzhan ni gzhan la brtan te gzhan/ /gzhan med par gzhan 
gzhan mi ‘gyur/ /gang la brten te gang yin pa//de ni de las gzhan mi ‘thad/  The Sanskrit is: anyad 
anyat pratītyānyan nānyad anyad ṛte 'nyataḥ / yat pratītya ca yat tasmāt tad anyan nopapadyate 
(Katsura and Siderits 2013: 149-150). 
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able to assert because successively perceived impermanance is not suitable as a cause 
because things of the past from among the three times would not arrive, 
disintegratedness and production would not exist. Since in the present at the same time 
there would not exist assistance or imputation, cause and effect would be pointless. 
Since the consequence of both faults and both being contradictory dharmas are not 
acceptable,  it is not from both. In the view of production from the condition of one’s 
own seed or cause, from the perspective produced from an other condition and it is 
produced of itself, since it is produced from an other, production would be from both 
[one’s own cause and a other]. For the Sāṃkhyas, since an entity of a result exists from 
the beginning, it is eliminated by conditions that exist from the perspective of the result 
existing from the beginning. If it is from itself and if it is from an other condition which 
clarifies, how can it be both? The condition of the seed and the cause is not itself 
established, because it is cause and effect, as the former and later are different.  
Likewise, since the conditions themselves are not established, as both product and 
non-product are different, one is not released from the previous defect of the 
consequence of both faults.  
 
 “Because that which is causeless does not depend on anything else, it would 
be either permanently existent or permanently nonexistent. Things occur 
intermittently because they are dependent.”65  
 
   This reasoning [indicates] there is not arising without a cause. Regarding this, for 
those who advocate causeless arising: Who is cut by a sharp thorn? Who draws the 
colorful tail of the peacock? Who makes the stem, leaves, and flowers of the lotus?, if 
all these arise without a cause? This refutes those who advocate causeless arising. 
Since it is without distinction if it is causeless, the qualities of a peacock would exist 
for a crow and so forth. The qualities of a lotus would exist for a willow, a 
rhododendron bush, and so forth. [9b] Since Jñānagarbha states from his Two Realities 
that, “Many do not produce one, many do not produce many, one does not produce 
                                                   
65 Pramāṇavārttika 1.35. Dunne 2004: 336-337, PV 1.35: tathā ca nityaṃ sattvam asattvaṃ vāhetor 
anyānapekṣaṇāt / apekṣāto hi bhāvānāṃ kādācitkatva-sambhavaḥ // Tib. rgyu med gzhan la mi ltos 
phyir/ rtag tu yod pa’am med par ’gyur/ dngos po rnams ni res (P k418b.3) ’ga’ zhig/ ’byung ba ltos 
pa las yin (D273a.5) no (PV 1.35 = PVin 2.58). Verse is preserved in Candraharipa’s Ratnamālā.  
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many, and one does not produce one,”66 production is not acceptable when examining 
the four extremes. Conventionally, it is only fundamental for the arising of one result 
from a collection of many causes and conditions while ultimately this is not acceptable. 
Although there exists many potencies for the faculties, objects, appearances, and 
mental engagements as a cause because it is not agreeable for cause and effect as there 
is not other than a single quality of consciousness that is the result, a single result will 
be causeless. Would not the arising of many results by many causes since there is 
arising which has the immediately preceeding condition similar to the cause, the eye 
faculty, and the apprehension of form and the self which cognizes the consciousness 
that is a result from the object such as form? Accordingly, the nature of the 
consciousness and realization and so forth would either be one or many. If you ask 
would it be one, is it one as the nature of a single consciousness or many distinct? If 
according to the first, there would be the previous fault of one arising from many and if 
according to the second there would be many visual consciousnesses. If there are many, 
an arising of the nature and so forth which is realized by many conditions but since 
consciousness is not produced, consciousness would be causeless. Furthermore, when 
many produce many, are each and every result that is produced applied to all the causes 
or is each and every cause applied to each and every result? If according to the first, 
there would be the fault of producing one by many and if according to the second, there 
would be the fault of producing one by one. The cause, the faculty of the eye itself, 
produce later a concordant of its own type and eye consciousness produced, does one 
produce the many? Accordingly, is the faculty which produces a concordant type and 
the faculty which produces consciousnesss an identical or distinct nature. Is it 
identical? Accordingly, it is not suitable for many natures of a result to arise from a 
single nature of a cause. If it is distinct, there would be many which are produced from 
many. Furthermore, since the nature of the cause, not different than one, would arise, 
many qualities for the result, cause and effect would be discordant. Many results would 
be without a cause and by a single cause many results would be produced 
simultaneously or would be produced gradually. If according to the first, all the results, 
many simultaneously would be cognized at one time and when according to the second, 
there would occur the fault of producing many by many. What if one cause produced 
                                                   
66 See Jñānagarbha, Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā (verse 14, translation Eckel 1987: 80).  
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only one result? Accordingly, would the sense-faculty at the time of producing a single 
result produce only that which accords with its own type or would it produce only a 
consciousness? If according to the first, by not producing consciousness, all sentient 
beings would obtain the status of matter at the first moment. [10a] If according to the 
second, by interrupting what is concordant with its own type in the two kinds of 
moments, all sentient beings would become deaf and blind, and so forth. Both cause 
and effect, when examined by one and many, are not established. Śāntarakṣita from his 
Madhyamakālaṃkāra, at first analyzes the Self and so forth determining that they are 
not suitable as entities as they do not have causal efficacy to produce a result when 
empty. If causally efficacious, is it instantaneous or gradual? It is not the first, since all 
results are cognized successively. It is not the second as existing sequentially for the 
result the cause is impermanent by a consequence as many, the permanent, and the 
single alone would degenerate. Likewise, with respect to directional parts do they exist 
differently or do they exist in singularlity?  
 
“[It is claimed that] the atom in the center is in contact with [the other atoms 
forming one particle], or that it is surrounded [by them with intervals 
remaining in between], or that it is in non-dimensional contiguity [with them, 
being neither contact nor intervals between them].”67 
 
 “[However], if some say, [the atom in the center] entirely faces one atom in 
the front and also entirely faces another atom, then how can there be gross 
things like earth, water and so forth?”68 
 
   Through such reasoning, by having various parts the form aggregate is not 
established as a unity. In this way, many is not established as well, since not 
establishing many the support and the object are not established. The five sense-doors, 
consciousness are not established and since those are not established, the mind as soon 
as it stops is not established, and since that is not established, the consciousness of the 
                                                   
67  Madhyamakālaṃkāra 11 (Ichigo 1989:192-193); TS 1989 saṃyuktaṃ dūradeśasthaṃ 
nairantaryavyavasthitam / ekāṇvabhimukhaṃ rūpaṃ yang aṇor madhyavarttinaḥ / /  
68  Madhyamakālaṃkāra 12 (Ichigo 1989:195); TS 1989: aṇvantarābhimukhyena tad eva yadi 
kalpyate / pracayo bhūdharādīnām evaṃ sati na yujyate / /  
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mind is not established, and in this way, since the six-fold collection of consciousness 
does not establish the mind, the mental factors such as happiness which are unified 
with those are also not established. In this way, since form, mind, and mental factors 
are not established, the non-associated factors that are determined on the status of those 
are not established. Thus, since the aggregates are not established, the elements and the 
sensory-spheres are not established and mere cognitive representations, by the 
reasoning of the many aspects and the non-differentiated, are not established as a unity. 
The unconditioned, space, and so forth, since they are connected with forms having 
various parts, are not established as a unity. The unconditioned, if it is not an object of 
knowledge, then it is established as not having intrinsic nature. If it is an object of 
knowledge, since knowledge is connected successively, the unconditioned also would 
be impermanent and would be as many, therefore it is not established as a unity.  The 
Madhyamakālaṃkāra states:  
 
“When any entity is examined, no unity is found in it.  Where there is no unity, 
plurality cannot be found either.”69 
 
Thus by this reasoning the many is also not established and the Ācārya [Nāgārjuna]  
states:  
 
“Because the aggregate of form is only a name, space also is only a name. 
Without the elements [10b] how can forms exist? Therefore, even name-only 
does not exist.”70 
 
   Thus, space is not substantially established and that nature is suitable. The 
Madhyamaka Pañcaskandhaka asserts the unconditioned to be four including space, 
the two cessations, and suchness. The unconditioned itself is also established as lacking 
inherent existence. In this way, when examined by settling dependent-arising, even 
something the size of the tip of a hair that is split a hundred times cannot be 
                                                   
69 Madhyamakālaṃkāra 61 (Ichigo 1989:210-211); TS 1995 tad evaṃ sarvapakṣeṣu naivaikātmā sa 
yujyate / ekāniṣpattito ’nekasvabhāvo ’pi na sambhavī / /  
70 Ratnāvalī 1.99: gzugs kyi dngos po ming tsam phyir / /nam mkha’ yang ni ming tsam mo / /’byung 
med gzugs lta ga la yod / / de phyir ming tsam nyid kyang med 
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grasped. That is established and afterwards all that exists is sharply examined like this.  
The Ācārya [Nāgārjuna] states: 
 
“When an explanation is made through emptiness, whoever claims a fault 
about it all of that is not designated a fault as that is equivalent to what is to be 
proven.  
 
When there is an argument about emptiness, whoever gives an answer any of 
that is not a answer as that is equivalent to what is to be proven.”71  
 
The Madhyamakāvatāra (6.68a-c) states:  
 
“Since their giving such and such a reply is seen as similar to this and that 
thesis,”72 
 
   This teaching is comprehensive in regards to everything. Through hearing and 
reflection the two realities are ascertained just like this.  
   [10b4] The text discusses meditation itself when it states “on a comfortable seat” 
and so forth. First, just as it is taught from the Bodhi[patha]pradīpa, through having 
conviction in the karmic principal of cause and effect, one does not disregard even the 
most subtle transgression. One should stay with the factors of method to the extent that 
one can achieve the five perfections through being impelled by the aspiration for 
awakening. With a single teaching, even a mere incense bowl as the object of 
meditation, one should practice in the concentration of emptiness. In this way, by 
indicating the factors of method at the time of cultivating wisdom, it is necessary to 
                                                   
71 Kadam author cites an old Tibetan translation of Mūlamadhyamakakārika of verse 4.8 and 4.9 in 
inverse order that reads: stong pa nyid skyis bshad byas tshe / /gang zhig skyon ’dogs smra byed pa / 
/de’i thams cad skyon btags min / /bsgrub par bya dang mtshung par ’gyur / [4.9]  /stong pa nyid kyi 
brtsad byas tshe / gang zhig lan ’debs smra byed pa / /de’i thams cad lan btab min / /bsgrub par bya 
dang mtshung par ’gyur / [4.8]. The Tibetan Kanjur reads 4.8 and 4.9 as: /stong pa nyid kyis brtsad 
byas tshe/ /gang zhig lan 'debs smra byed pa/ /de yi thams cad lan btab min/ /bsgrub par bya dang 
mtshungs par 'gyur/[4.8] / /stong pa nyid kyis bshad byas tshe/ /gang zhig skyon 'dogs smra byed pa/ 
/de yi thams cad skyon btags min/ /bsgrub par bya dang mtshungs par 'gyur/ [4.9] MMK Skt. 
4.8-4.9;Katsura and Siderits 2013:56-57. 
72 Madhyamakāvatāra 6.68a-c (La Vallée Poussin 159.6-7): ’di yis lan ni gang dang gang btab pa / 
/de dang de ni dam bcas  {LVP bca’} mtshungs mthong nas {LVP mthong bas}/   
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remain in solitude for the acquisition of meditative serenity (zhi gnas, śamatha). All 
worldly activities are to be settled as one is incapable [of settling them] in the time 
frame of remaining in solitude. If a little bit [of worldly activity] occurs during solitude 
that is not satisfying. As the Kam73 say, as soon as one closes the eyes it would not do 
to remember all the lower worldly activities. As the elements of solitude have few 
activities, one must not have any activities at all which are not meditation. Furthermore, 
by having few desires and being easily satisfied, the concordant conditions of 
meditation, one will be easily satisfied with the bare necessities. One should keep 
distant from the place of one’s birth, abandoning kinsmen. Just as teaching in fives the 
accumulation of special insight, [11a] ascertain well the characteristics of the two 
realities through studying and contemplation, as well as the well-received special 
instruction of cultivating special insight in accordance with the spiritual friend. At first, 
one should have compassion by considering sentient beings as one’s parents, who are 
confused in the meaning of the two realities, and who, through the power of 
apprehending non-existent things, wander in saṃsāra and are differentiated by various 
sufferings which do not [actually] exist. All sentient beings have previously discarded 
the ability to realize the meaning of the two realities as well as the ability to cultivate 
the meaning of non-arising as a means to eliminate apprehending things as real. Pay 
homage, worship with offerings, confess transgressions, and supplicate in order to 
manifest all the buddhas and bodhisattvas who reside in the ten directions and all the 
three jewels. The Bhāvanākrama states that all the activities of the path of activity 
including greater and lesser external actions should be well done. Sit on a comfortable 
seat cross-legged or in a half-crossed legged pose; the path of activity is the method for 
being able to remain [in meditation] for a long time. Remember to keep the body very 
straight as one should be fully directed toward the object of meditation. One should 
place the nose and the navel as one would cast a line. One should bend in front slightly 
to the left and right. Place the teeth and lips as usual and set the tongue against the 
upper front teeth. Do not keep the eyes wide open nor closed but rather, in the path of 
activity, set [the eyes] at a mere four fingers widths at the tip of one’s nose as 
mentioned in the middle Bhāvanākrama. As for mental applications such as 
impermanence and so forth on the path of application do freely as you like. It is 
                                                   
73 According to Dan Martin, Bru II 291.2, Kam is a Tibetan clan name.  
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suitable to lie down or rest on one’s back even on a road. Consider spreading ten 
fingers out on one’s chest. Then, examine this [object] with reasoning. This is the 
special instructions. One goes astray by forcing the breath through the means of mantra 
as a method of mental stability remaining as if everything is existent. Examine with 
reasoning all objects of knowledge entities and non-entities are classified as two. 
Non-existent unconditioned entities are not necessary to negate as they are non-entities. 
Others’ imputations of a Self of a person and so forth or the appearances to one’s own 
mind, since they are actually empty, are not substantially established and are not 
objectified externally, internally, or something other than that. Efficacious entities are 
exhausted as merely two [,those having form and those not having form]. Regarding 
that, having form, from the perspective of the aggregates is the aggregate of form and 
there are four forms of cause. The forms of result include five faculties and five objects 
that make ten. When summarized together [11b] this makes fourteen. As the forms of 
cause and effect are classified into two, they are not established as a unity. The 
elements that pertain to a cause are distinguished as four and are not established as a 
unity. Each individual element is not independently established even though they are 
not included within the other three. Even something solid is not established as a unity 
when distinguished by directional parts. Resultant forms are not established as a unity 
when distinguished into sense faculties and objects. Since there are five [sense 
faculties] and five [sense objects], each one individually is not established as a unity 
when distinguished by directional parts. Soundless are the eight substances of subtle 
atoms. Possessing the sense of touch is the ninth substance. Through the principle 
which is called “tenth substance for another faculty,” there is a dissimilar substance of 
an atom. The four elements from the four sense-organs, the four substances according 
to the atoms of color, odor, taste, and tangible object makes eight. Since the body sense 
power pervades everywhere, the ninth substance are those atoms. [11b4] The eye and 
so forth have an individual atomic substance for each one that makes ten, and they are 
grouped as ten. One should closely view the atoms of an existent sound. The body 
sense-power has nine or ten. The objects not comprised by the sense-powers are eight 
or nine. If comprised of eight or nine they are not established as a unity as each 
individual atom when divided by directional parts will become either six or ten. The 
measure of a subtle atom: the most subtle [atom] in the dust mote of a sunbeam will 
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become a little more than two hundred thousand by six distinctions of stages from an 
“ox particle.”74 With respect to a subtlety such like this, when distinguished by six or 
ten directions, it is extremely subtle without remainder and does not appear as an object 
of the mind. In this way, as the aggregate of form is not established, the elements and 
the sensory-spheres which have form are also not established because the ten elements 
and sense-spheres which possess form in regards to the aggregate of form itself are 
posited as ten. [11b6] The name basis of that not having form is the aggregates and 
that itself is posited on the side of the seven elements of mind, the sensory-sphere of 
the mental (manāyatana), and the element (dhātu) and sensory-sphere (āyatana) of 
dharma. Grouped together, all awarenesses are called “mind.” It is clear to designate 
mental factors in the context of the mind so that one does not think to group things 
beyond [mind and mental factors] when examining the status of those two. 
Furthermore, the unestablishment of that which has form is not established as 
mentioned before but, when examining the nature of that itself, the past and so forth 
will change into the three times [of past, present, and future] and the mind is asserted 
by all as impermanent. Furthermore, in general, since it is the special instructions to 
break things down from the coarse at first, from previous rebirths up to the present 
[life] and future rebirths from here on make three. [12a] Then this [life] itself is 
gradually broken down into years, months, days, and moments. Here, in terms of the 
very moment itself, the past and the future are non-existent. Candrakīrti teaches that 
since everything is impermanent, there is nothing other than mere cause and effect. 
Since cause and effect is mere dependence, it is conventional, but is itself not at all 
ultimately established. Here, the present moment is extremeley difficult to examine. 
That which does not have form does not have color like white and so forth and is free 
from shapes like a square and so forth. When it has such a nature of that, apart from 
being devoid of touch which obstructs, since it is not established as a material nature, it 
is not established like space. In another way, it is devoid of unity and multiplicity. 
When considering an object of mental awareness called “mind” for all awarenesses and 
classifying that into mind (sems) and mental factors (sems las byung ba) it is not 
                                                   
74 According to Rangjung Yeshe Dictionary an 'ox particle' (6) is a measure the size of seven {lug 
rdul}, dust raised by a flock of sheep (5), a measure the size of seven rabbit particles {ri bong gi rdul} 
(4), a measure the size of seven water particles' (chu rdul) (3), which are equal to seven lcags rdul, 
'iron particles' (2), a measure the size of seven minute particles {rdul phran} (1). 
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established as a unity. This applies to mental factors also, for the feeling which is 
produced as the nature of experience, the perception which apprehends signs, and the 
conditioning factor which are produced as the nature of effort and exertion, may be 
classified into three and are not established as a unity. The mind, [12a4] which has the 
nature of ideation and feeling itself by dividing at the base is three. Through classifying 
those into being produced in an assembly of six groups of consciousness that is 
distinguished into eighteen that are not established as a unity. There are even more than 
that when divided by the apprehension of signs. Even more than that, when produced 
as the nature of effort and striving and conditional factors are like a mass of a plantain 
tree. Consciousness also, from among six or eight groups, is various when divided for 
the object for each and every one. Since it observes the accumulation of consciousness 
for the five organs, the consciousness of the eye perceives various colors and shapes up 
to the bodily consciousness perceiving various objects of touch. Since mental 
consciousness has the nature to perceive the various eight conditioned dharmas and 
eight unconditioned dharmas and so forth,  that which is called an aggregate is not 
established as singular.  If one asserts that the mental factors do not exist and that 
consciousness exists as one group, the Ratnāvalī states,  
 
If the instant has a final moment, we must assume that it has the other two 
moments as well, viz. the initial and the middle; but inasmuch as the instant 
consists of three moments, the world cannot have the duration of the instant. 
(I.69) Again, beginning, middle, and end must be considered to be like the 
instant, viz. divided each one into three moments; the condition of being 
beginning, middle, and end [is not existent by itself nor by another.]75 
 
   Thus, consciousness is not established as a unity and is accepted by all as being 
momentary. From this it is necessary to accept an end point. [12b] Further, since the 
beginning is dependent upon a middle, it becomes three. When contemplating each and 
                                                   
75 Ratnāvalī I.69-70abc; English Dunne/McClintock 1997. Tib. ji ltar skad cig mtha’ yod pa / / de 
bzhin thog ma dbus brtag go / /de ltar skad cig gsum bdag phyir / / ’jig rten skad cig gnas pa min / 
[1.69] / thog ma dbus dang tha ma yang / / skad cig bzhin du bsam par bya / / thog ma dbus dang tha 
ma nyid / /[1.70abc]. Skt. yathānto ’sti kṣaṇasyaivam ādimadhyaṃ ca kalpyatām / tryātmakatvāt 
kṣaṇasyaivaṃ na lokasya kṣaṇaṃ sthitiḥ //69// ādimadhyāvasānāni cintyāni kṣaṇavat punaḥ / 
ādimadhyāvasānatvaṃ //70abc.  
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every one of the three as momentary, by the same reasoning the three will each have 
three making nine parts. At any rate, the measure of a instant is taught as one finger 
snap in the refutation of sixty-two [views] from [Candrakīrti’s] Catuḥśatakaṭīka. In 
other [texts] that to be refuted is one hundred twenty or three hundred sixty. It is 
worthless to examine it down to this extent as it occurs without an intrinsic nature. In 
another way, it is unproduced when examined by the five reasonings which refute 
production. Alternatively, there is natural luminiousity and through breaking down 
through these reasonings [things] are not made empty but since they are naturally 
unproduced, when they are not elaborated by elaborations or not conceptualized by 
conceptions of this is form, this is not form, low and excellent, large and middle-sized 
and so forth, it is called “luminious.”  
 
“Abiding, arising, and ceasing, existence and non-existence, low, middle, and 
superior—the Buddha spoke of these under the power of wordly transactions, 
not under the power of reality.”76  
 
How is the mind accepted as naturally luminious? This is through the principle that it is 
unsuitable to be comprised of adventitious defilements. The nature of the mind is 
luminosity and that itself is also called the element of sentient beings or the essence of 
the Tathāgata (tathāgatagarbha). Since all conceptual elaborations are adventitious 
defilements, that nature is suitable to actualize through familiarizing in study and 
reflection in purifying the adventitious defilements. [12b6] It is like the Yogācāras who 
teach that it is considered pure just as water, gold, and space are pure. In this way, 
when analyzed and broken down by the weapons of reasoning, objects of 
knowledge, in the perspective of either having form or not having form are not at all 
established since the very wisdom which individually discriminates is not 
established. This illustration is suitable as form, experience, and so forth are specific 
characteristics. The general characteristics of all conditioned things are 
impermanent, the general characteristic of all contaminated things are suffering, and 
the general characteristic of all things is that they are selfless and so forth. Since all 
                                                   
76 Śūnyatāsaptati 1: gnas pa dang {Lindtner ’am} skye ’jig yod med dang {Lindtner dam}/ dman 
dang khyad par can rnams ni {Lindtner dman pa’i am mnyam pa’am khyad par can} / sangs rgyas ’jig 
rten snyad dbang gis / gsung gi di nyid {Lindtner yang dag} dbang gis min //  
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things are unestablished, the very wisdom is without appearance. Since the wisdom 
itself in the interval of refuting is without appearance, as an object of mind it does not 
exist. However, since the final relation is said to not be established at all in the 
explanation of reality, that which is form, that which is not form, and the very wisdom 
itself are naturally unestablished. The explanation of luminosity means that it is free 
from the extremes of elaboration and it is free from all the eight extremes of 
elaboration, such as distinctions of dharmas like cessation and production and so forth. 
{When many, the five former are indicated by each following one.} 
   [13a1] In this way, having settled at the time of application, one eliminates the 
faults of laxity and excitement from being established in the non-conceptual state at 
the time of meditative equipoise. Laxity is gathering the mind uncontrollably in 
practice by being overcome with sleepiness, lethargy, and so forth. In going to sleep 
one arises not apprehending the object of meditation. It is taught in divisions of great 
and middling like entering non-darkness, like blinking one’s eyes, and like a blind 
person. Excitement is being totally scattered to other objects of meditation, a 
distraction derived from attention being scattered to other virtues. Eradicating those: 
Through meditating on entities that are clear and bright, laxity passes away. When a 
time of hardship occurs, select an antidote to both just as Śāntideva has taught that one 
should meditate on only the remembrance of death. One should sprinkle water on the 
face if one has gone to sleep or, at the time of great noise it is suitable to proceed in 
reciting the stories of a father’s death. It is said to be like a great medicine that 
eradicates all unharmonious positions when meditating on only emptiness. To 
summarize in brief, it eradicates all others like the five faults and the five obscurations. 
Moreover, during the time of meditative equipoise in which any knowledge or objects 
of knowledge are not at all established, even objects of knowledge, that which has form, 
that which does not have form, and wisdom itself are not cognized. [13a6] Anything 
whatsoever is non-conceptual. The apprehended object and apprehending subject, or 
the obstruction and the antidote, are also non-conceptual. Applying the three later 
words as a cause of non-conceptual, or in another way, by not apprehending anything 
at all memory does not exist and through not comprehending anything one abandons 
all mental activity and stands firm. As for this, the practitioners of the Great 
Completion (rdzogs chen), the practitioners of non-mentation (amanasikāra) (see 
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Higgins 2008), and those who enter instantaneously assert that [meditation] is through 
merely being without memory and mental attentiveness which overturns the scattering 
of knowledge for the object. Just as one will not be free from the fear of demons by 
meditating that demons are not in the castle, likewise one will not be free from the fear 
of apprehending things as real. As previously mentioned, it is necessary to develop 
non-conceptual concentration in a way which cuts off attachment by means of not 
finding when searching through reasoning. [13b] It is like when an intelligent person 
having hoisted up a lamp, through searching but not finding, is free from the fear of a 
demon. Distinguishing signs include the five objects of form and so forth, the three 
times, persons, and the distinguishing signs of women make ten. Many more occur in 
the section on signlessness as a door of liberation from the Mother [Perfection of 
Wisdom] sūtras. Of concern at present, the grasping of signs of that which has form, 
that which does not have form, and wisdom or even conceptuality, the conceptuality of 
the obscuration and the antidote. A sign is an object that scatters [the mind] like a thief 
who sneakingly steals non-conceptual concentration. Conceptuality is a coarse object 
that is like an enemy by scattering the actual non-conceptual concentration. One should 
abide in the non-conceptual state being free from these [signs and conceptions]. When 
they arise, through eradicating as mentioned before the grasping at signs and the very 
object of conceptuality, one will train in the non-conceptual mental continuum for 
objects of knowledge not yet accomplished. The chapter which brings forth the 
[teachings of the] Ācārya [Nāgārjuna] which was bestowed by the Lord [Atiśa] to 
Gsang-phu-ba.  
   [13b3] Then, if one decides to go beyond one hour twenty minutes and so forth for 
the duration of the [meditation] session, one should rise up when the body and mind 
become fatigued. As well, if not knowing the time by oneself, one should do the right 
amount according to one’s teacher or superior. Similar to that, when suddenly 
interrupted afterwards, it is unacceptable for the mind in meditation. It is unacceptable 
for the mind to sit again in the same seat after [immediately] going away while not 
meditating. One should sit down continually in meditation without being suddenly 
interrupted when there is adequate focus on a little bit for the object of meditation.  
When rising from the meditation mat, make a clap. Since harm or sickness may occur 
as there is danger to harm the body and mind,  just as Dgon-pa-ba and Pu-to-ba have 
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done,  extend all the limbs, rub smoothly all the muscles, and with a pleasant and 
pliable body rise up and go. Moreover, the cross-legged posture should be disrupted 
without rising in the same way. The way things are should be examined as before by 
oneself and meditate just as there is indeed non-production. However, one should 
dedicate roots of virtue for perfect buddhahood to the extent to reach all the things 
grasped as real by sentient beings [13b7] by projecting compassion for sentient beings 
who wander in saṃsāra by the force of not cognizing [things as unproduced]. At the 
time of meditation, having closed the door or covered the window, sit it meditation. 
Having arisen [from meditation], it is said that one should not eat in the field or give 
mother’s milk to a calf, or grass to a horse. For all fields and commerce and so forth, it 
will not do to ask if they are accomplished or not accomplished. [14a] This is to get 
distracted with imputing imputations while all phenomena are like an illusion; mental 
engagement and so forth is like thick mist or like a rainbow. One should do virtuous 
acts and so forth as much as possible for the two collections or the six perfections by 
body, speech, and mind through the method of three-fold perfect purity [of agent, 
action, and object]. One should dedicate as much as one achieves for the purpose of 
complete awakening. As in the interval on emptiness, it is taught that afterwards 
[things] are like an illusion. Generally, since this is settled after the unmistaken 
treasure of meditative equipoise, it is necessary to weaken attachment for this life after 
meditative equipoise on impermanence. It is necessary to shun evil and increase virtue 
after meditative equipoise on the relations of cause and effect. In this manner, one 
should ascertain all meditations with postcontemplative knowledge. Both quantities of 
meditative equipoise can be purified in Reting (rwa-sgreng). Later on it can even exist 
in all places. Postcontemplative knowledge is in disagreement with all the world. One 
should uphold a large part of harmonious practices of a bodhisattva which is taught 
from all the sūtras and śāstras of the Mahāyāna and rejoice in altruism for others, 
Pu-to-ba has [discussed] this. Right now in one’s own meditative equipoise, cultivate 
only the aspect of integration. In this lifetime’s postconcentrative state there is not 
another which is desired. Just a few greatly invoke mindfulness in this lifetime, the 
extremes of the head and shoulder are like one who hears that leads a blind person. The 
great majority of people do not live apart from desirable things in addition to food, 
clothing, and dear ones like one’s relatives. The beginner should create as much virtue 
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as possible at the time of being unable to fully subdue, doing as much as possible for 
each [meditative] fixation with respect to different factors during each individual 
juncture will become meaningful. Finally, it is necessary to offer aspirational prayers 
and cultivate devotion completely engaging in what is necessary to be done to achieve 
complete buddhahood. Having done this in this way, by meditating on emptiness, one 
will surely become a master and it will serve as an antidote of all unfavorable 
conditions. The conduct of the postconcentrative state produces multiple virtues in 
one’s own mental continuum and one will nourish sentient beings. In cultivating 
emptiness alone which is not like that, one will not cognize suchness, and even if 
cognizing, it will be from the point of view of a śrāvaka. 
   [14a8] In this way, the measure of devotion, from the Śikṣasamuccaya, just as one 
wishes for a cool water source in a burning house, oneself and [14b] all mother-like 
sentient beings, through gathering the evil spirit of grasping things as real or through 
the darkness of delusion, accumulate various bad actions which are motivated by that 
and have extensive passionate attachment. One wanders in cyclic existence which is 
like a house blazing everywhere. Then, through emerging from [cyclic existence], by 
cultivating the meaning of non-production, it is by great devotion that one thinks that 
grasping things as real is to be avoided, but it is the undegenerated essence. Moreover, 
one is said to reach the boundary at the point of the fundamental state of awakening, 
the essence, when not falling into scattering while meditating for as long as one is able 
and for a long time. Futhermore, it is necessary to employ both meditative equipoise 
and posterior practices continuously for multiple years, months, days, or even for an 
instant. After eliminating unceasing evil deeds, it is necessary to have a basis of 
meditation. Then, at that time, unconscientious behaviour will be eliminated. With 
solid erroneous predispositions, not to abandon the taste of alcohol would not do; it is 
just like pursuing after an agitated cooked rotten fish while not knowing the pure 
portions. It is necessary to go without concern even in the time interval after meditation. 
From the point of view of those with incalculable good fortune, who have done what 
is needed to do, even the great amount of good fortune for the Noble Sadāprarudita77 
was mainly through practicing the factors of method. At the time of Geshe 
                                                   




gZhon ’byung arriving at Reting (rwa-sgreng) saying that there exists the special 
instructions for obtaining the accomplishment of the Great Seal (mahāmudrā) in this 
very lifetime {there is from each an existent even though not all (???)}. Pu-to-bas [has 
taught that] the fortune of attaining the accomplishment of the Great Seal in this very 
lifetime is not [innately] produced like our own complexion. Rather, it is said to be 
produced on the ground of one’s own [effort] like the eighteen different craftsman of 
the great city of the central land and those skilled in the five topics of science and so 
forth. The understanding of all phenomena is said to be the only thing that counts.  
Reality is again said to be only the single truth, the object of only the unproduced. It is 
just suchness. The worldly meditate on the state of non-production as emerging dimly 
as substantially existent and that does not pass beyond the conventional itself. All 
seeing is seeing false conventionalities. Meditative equipoise and the exact perception 
of the postconcentrative state during the time of a bodhisattva from the point of seeing 
reality onwards are precepts of the Saṃdhinirmocana [sūtra]. Called the center of the 
sky by being free from extremes, there does not exist a center which has a reference 
point. It is an example that illustrates nothing at all is established. The other eight 
examples of an illusion [15a] and so forth exist as mere appearances from collecting 
and assembling. The establishment of a real nature is an example which is established 
as non-existent.  Geshe Ston-pa widely taught that correct conventional activities are 
said to be mundane postconcentrative appearances. Since it is likewise, the 
post-meditative attainment after seeing reality realizes the true nature of the 
conventional. All the eight examples of illusion along with the plaintree, through the 
blessing of the Buddha, come forth as a means to understand the meaning of 
non-production. After the subsiding of the teachings, all those who are incapable are 
taught the [analogy of the] echo from this moment on as a measure of disappearance. 
   [15a2] The text states “From the point of time when” indicating to ascertain the 
meaning at the level of a Buddha. The text states that the concentration is like the 
example of a vajra. Just as the vajra destroys all entities while not being able to be 
destroyed by any other entity, likewise when attaining this concentration all the 
latencies of apprehending things as real are destroyed while whichever apprehension of 
things as real is unable to create a nature which apprehends things as real. The teaching 
of Candrakīrti asserts that, from this point on, all movements of mind and mental 
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factors are perpetually cut off.  Here, it is a system which does not assert the activity 
of postconcentrative attainment other than only meditative equipoise. Even if accepting 
postconcentrative attainment, alternations [between meditative equipoise and 
postconcentrative attainment] are not accepted. The object of meditation of meditative 
equipoise at all times is taught to be reality. The Daśabhūmika sūtra, through questions 
and answers, teaches that it is only the welfare of sentient beings. The meaning is that 
by the first moment of exalted wisdom in the second moment of attaining the vajra-like 
concentration through the principle “that totally pervades the sphere of objects of 
knowledge,” all objects of knowledge just as they are (ji lta ba, yathāvad-bhāvika) and 
to their utmost extent (ji snyed pa, yāvad-bhāvika) are spontaneously realized just as 
they are. After that, shining like a great sun that never declines is the meaning of 
abiding.  We settle this awkwardly only on the Buddha stage. That is understood as 
merely nirvāṇa of the sūtras in not having a continum of utmost highest wisdom. One 
is unable to measure as merely entering into the stabilizing on the meditation of 
cessation since at the time it is only the meditative equipoise not possessing subsequent 
knowledge. It would not do to understand it as time that is opposite from blinking the 
eyes or deep sleep. [15b] One proceeds only with faith in following Mahāyāna sūtras 
alone on the qualities of the Buddha level. However, that is not realized from the 
śāstras.  Since even the lords of the tenth stage are said not to realize [things] other 
than the sun among the clouds or merely the space of a needle’s eye, how could we 
realize [reality] by stating only what is picked out by our own conceptuality? At the 
time of asking Geshe Ston-pa whether a continuum of wisdom was possessed or not 
and whether subsequent attainment was possessed or not at the level of a buddha, [he 
replied.] “I say that I have not known awakening indivisibly and exactly as it is because 
it is not known previously by anyone other than a Buddha himself.” Therefore, it is 
suitable if ill at ease in the world for the Buddha to be the source of one’s own refuge.  
It is suitable even if ill at ease with the thought in mind to save sentient beings in order 
to attain buddhahood. The purpose of sentient beings is suitable whether or not it is 
suitable for there to be a continuum of wisdom or whether or not subsequent attainment 
is suitable or not. This is like the conceptual thought which precedes the preparation for 
wisdom. Furthermore, it is said to be from only being projected at the time of 
generating the initial aspiration thought [for awakening]. Stating “if it is not so that 
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there is not subsequent attainment on the level of a Buddha then what is the 
distinction with a bodhisattva?, these and similar words, it may be that this teaching 
is not indicated in reasoning and scripture but since the activity of subsequent 
attainment is a quality of training to be done, it is only taught in the sūtras of reasoning 
themselves. Isn’t it deceiving sentient beings who are entertained at first by cutting off 
the benefit of others when abiding on the ground of only permanent meditative 
equipoise? How does the benefit for others arise? This is as follows. At first by 
generating compassion one produces the altruistic aim for sentient beings. Then, the 
accumulations are gathered for the purpose of only sentient beings. Aspirational 
prayers are also set for the purpose of only [sentient beings]. One does not meet with 
the purpose of sentient beings from the power of meditative equipoise itself from the 
perspective of a Buddha who is proper to sentient beings. Furthermore, from the 
beginning of buddhahood, because of the ability to completely accomplish the welfare 
of sentient beings, until sentient beings  are exhausted, [the Buddha’s] appearance and 
disappearance does not exist and [he] comes forth spontaneously independent of 
exertion. Therefore, there is also not forgetting. There is forgetfulness when it is 
necessary to rely on effort and exertion. In this way, from the purview of a Buddha 
there is not conceptuality. This does not conflict with the forces of the fortune of 
sentient beings who are different due to outward actions and actions based on the five 
sense objects into differences of higher and lower. From the Tathāgatotpatti- 
sambhāva-sūtra, 
 
“At the time when the orb of the sun arises initially, it reflects on the elevated 
mountain peaks [16a] then gradually it heroically reflects in all the deep forests 
and in the lower areas as it is taught that the qualities of the buddha level are in 
every way a system of deeds for the benefit of others. Through the qualities of 
the Tathāgata and his inconceivable wisdom: some are in the circle of 
attendents; some slope towards becoming a monk of the Tathāgata and are 
known to renounce the family; some become monks; some practice austerities; 
some proceed to the seat of awakening; some understand him to sit at the seat 
of awakening; some understand that he conquers over Māra; some know that 
he manifests Buddhahood; some understand that he is requested to turn the 
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wheel of dharma by Brahmā and so forth; some understand that he turns the 
wheel of dharma; some hear him give a discourse on the śrāvaka vehicle; some 
hear him give a discourse on the pratyekabuddha vehicle; some hear him give a 
discourse on the Great Vehicle; some see a six fold tall Tathāgata; some 
instantly hear him from far away; some see him in the body of a Tathāgata 
hundreds of thousands of niyutas of koṭis long; some see him as a golden 
colored Tathāgata; some see him as the color of a precious wish-fulfilling 
jewel; some understand him to pass into complete nirvāṇa; some understand 
him to achieve complete nirvāṇa; some understand him to be inclined to 
engagement; some understand him as one incorruptible body; some understand 
him to establish relics of a Tathāgata; some understand him to mature ten years 
after attaining complete buddhahood; some understand him to pass ten years 
from his complete nirvāṇa; some understand him to arrive at the terrace of 
awakening; some understand the teaching of Bhagavan Śākyamuni to 
disappear; some understand ten, twenty, thirty, forty, or hundreds of thousands 
of niyutas of koṭis of aeons since his complete nirvāṇa; some understand an 
ineffable number of aeons since Bhagavan Śākyamuni’s buddhahood. The 
Tathāgata perpetually grows in these activities through the force of considering 
the welfare of sentient beings nonconceptually, without conceptuality, even 
more so in a spontaneous non-conceptual manner.”   
 
The Ārya Avataṃsaka Sūtra states:  
 
“Mañjuśrī, it is as follows: [16b] For example, there is an ocean which is five 
thousand yojanas in size. A bird sits at the edge [of the ocean] as it is suitable 
to drink. There are some lotus leaf coverings. With respect to this, a man has a 
thousand spoked wheel iron chariot. The chariot is drawn speedily by a strong 
horse who is like a garuḍa bird, the axels do not touch the water when pulled 
by the horse, and the lotus petals are not injured when drawing the chariot in 
this way. A poisonous snake springs forth from the ocean. Instantly, in the 
moments of the turning of the chariot, [the snake] encircles the chariot seven 
times. In the moment of encircling the chariot one time by the poisonous snake, 
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the monk Ānanda explains and understands ten qualities of ten dharmas. In a 
moment of explaining a single dharma by Ānanda, the monk Śāradvatipūtra is 
able to understand in a single moment one thousand aspects of dharma. In a 
single moment of the aspects of dharma which Śāradvatipūtra explained, the 
monk Maudgalyāyana passes through eighty thousand world-realms. In the 
moment of which Maudgalyāyana passes through a world-realm, in that 
moment, the Tathāgata instantly teaches everywhere spontaneously in a 
non-conceptual manner, easily through the realm of reality (dharmadhātu), in 
world-realms of the ten directions to the limits of the realm of space, in each 
and every world-realm in all the ocean of galaxies, in each and every continent, 
to each and every hair on your head. Furthermore: dying and passing from the 
realm of Tuṣita; entering the womb; being born; being received by Indra and 
Brahmā; [16b6] arranging a dwelling place; taking seven steps; looking in the 
ten directions; making a great lion’s roar; training in arts, crafts, athletics and 
all the five sciences; being taught in the stages of royalty; sporting in the 
retinue of female attendents; going forth to the forest grove; tending toward 
omniscience; departure from home; taking up the homeless life; performing 
austerities; forsaking the eating of food; departing to and entering the seat of 
awakening; conquering over Mara; awakening into buddhahood; viewing with 
his eyes unblinking at the tree of awakening; being requested to teach by great 
Brahmā; turning the wheel of dharma; going to the divine realms; providing 
different aspects to the object of complete awakening; [17a] turning the wheel 
of the law; giving the name of the aeon, the measure of time, the array of the 
retinue, the manner in which the arrangement of the buddha-field is purified; 
the activity and aspiration of the mind for awakening, the perfections, grounds, 
supersensory knowledges, the patiences, the dhārāṇis, concentrations, 
liberations; the offerings for that; the immeasureable objects of dharma of the 
bodhisattvas and the Tathāgatas; the different engagements in the 
immeasurable cloud of dharma; the ripening of sentient beings; the different 
aspects of setting forth skillful means; emanating great miraculous emanations; 
indicating the great complete nirvāṇa; distributing solid relics in a single body; 
teaching great complete nirvāṇa; distributing solid relics in a single body; 
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teaching at all times during the flourishing of the practices of dharma; the 
conflicts, the diminishment, and even disappearance of the holy dharma. All 
the practices in the places of non-Buddhists even in all the succession of 
previous rebirths through teaching continuously through blessings to the limit 
of aeons until the end of time, on each and every mere hair, from the ten 
directions the very momentary object up through each and every hair-pore, the 
Tathāgatas in the three times, all along with the oceanic assembly of 
bodhisattvas, all the extensive array of buddha-qualities, all the arrays of the 
abodes of the lineages of sentient beings, the extensively designated 
sensory-spheres of the lineage of sentient beings, all of the extensively 
arranged, perfectly established activities of bodhisattvas, and all the extensive 
arrangement of the object of a Tathāgata, are instantly taught in a 
non-conceptual spontaneous manner. All the extensive array of omnipresent 
continuous blessings to the limit until the end of time he teaches down to the 
mere measure of a hair in that very moment through ten directions instantly 
teaching spontaneously and non-conceptually in all realms of sentient beings 
without exception, every sentient being without a body, all sentient beings with 
a body, and other distinctions of shape, color, voice, language, and different 
aspects of teaching dharma and so forth. [17b] Through the force of the 
thoughts of other sentient beings he teaches in all ways continuously through 
blessings to the limit until the end of time. Mañjuśrī, it is as follows, at the time 
of midnight of the fifteenth day of the waxing phase of the moon, the arising of 
the orb of the moon over Jambudvīpa is seen in places in front of all women, 
children, and young maidens. The orb of the moon non-conceptually without 
thought, yet spontaneously, arises like this having unshared qualities that are 
non-conceptual. Likewise, all sentient beings just as they resolve and just as 
they are to be trained are seen to dwell in front of the Tathāgata. The 
Tathāgatas, non-conceptually, without thought, yet spontanesouly, arise with 
such deeds through the unshared qualities of a Buddha.”  
 
   Thus through all sides is the benefit illustrated. Although there are many scriptures 
and reasonings for completely ascertaining the meaning of the two realities and 
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ascertaining the level of a Buddha, here, I will not elaborate. As the special instructions 
of meditating on the meaning of non-production is taught in the manner of pointing out 
with a finger, therefore, it is only instructions of the Middle Way. This is in accordance 
with engaging in the teachings of the methods of the non-conceptuality of 
non-production in all the texts of secret mantra. Teaching sometimes with another 
terminology is difficult to understand. Entering the spindle of that is a great abyss that 
is unsuitable for meditation. 
 
Through illuminating the special instructions of the middle way,  
whatever virtue I have have obtained,  
may all beings become omniscient  
through entering the path of the Middle Way.  
 
   [18a] In cutting off all affairs [of worldly life] one does not meet with evil friends. 
In meeting with good friends through proper measures, one should greatly progress in 
the protective commitments that one has promised. One should mainly refrain from 
material things such as food, clothing, and so forth of this life. However, do not fall 
into decay. Whatever dharma that has been produced in the present that is unfinished 
should not diminish. One should be greatly concerned about faulty moral virtue and 
spoiled vows. May it be auspicious.  
 
Abbreviations 
AA Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller, 1929) 
D Tshul khrims rin chen, Bstan ’gyur (sde dge), 1982-1985 
Dbu ma bden gnyis    Dbu ma bden gnyis kyi ’bum (Bka’ gdams gsung ’bum, 2003) 
Dbu ma’i mang ngag  Dbu ma’i man ngag gi ’bum, Bden chung gi ’bum (Bka’ gdams 
gsung ’bum, 2003; Apple 2013) 
Jo bo rje’i gsung ’bum  Jo bo rje dpal ldan a ti sha’i gsung ’bum (2006) 
LVP La Vallée Poussin 
MA  Madhyamakāvatāra (La Vallée Poussin (1907-12)) 
MABH Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (La Vallée Poussin (1907-12)) 
MMK  Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (La Vallée Poussin (1903-13)) 
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MSA Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Lévi reprint 1983) 
MVK Madhyāntavibhāgakārikā (Pandeya 1999) 
Pu to yab sras   Dbu ma’i man ngag gi bshad pa, Pu to yab sras kyi lugs (Bka’ gdams 
gsung ’bum, 2003) 
SDA Satyadvayāvatāra (Ejima 1983; Apple 2013) 
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